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Summary 
This paper proposes an institutional analytic framework to explain the path an economy 
takes from poverty to prosperity. Close examination of the development history of China 
since the Xinhai Revolution in 1911 under this framework indicates that it is the combination 
of the unbiased single-peaked governance and an access-opening economy that makes the 
high-speed growth of China over 40 years. Furthermore, a political economic general 
equilibrium model under the analytic framework is sketched and it is shown that continuous 
economic growth can be cultivated by either unbiased single-peaked or compromise-oriented 
multi-peaked political governance, as long as political cohesion and common actions can be 
achieved and economic accessibility is guaranteed. Based on a panel data set, we provide 
strong econometric evidence supporting the conjecture that a society’s cohesion can 
strengthen its economic growth, as can its degree of economic accessibility. But we cannot 
reject our third conjecture, that the single- vs multi-peaked character of political governance 
is a neutral variable in economic growth.  
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1 Introduction 
The question has long caused puzzlement: why some countries have become rich while 
others on the same planet remain poor? China is on the path from poverty to prosperity, 
through the efforts of more than 1 billion people over 40 years; most advanced economies 
have followed an earlier model, involving the efforts of another billion people over two or 
three centuries. The experiences of these two billion people seem to indicate that some 
common factor underpins the economic development of human beings. 
 
Based on the stylised facts of economic development across the world, we propose a new 
institutional analytic framework to explain the path a country takes from poverty to prosperity, 
with more emphasis on the fundamental factors underlying political institutions. In this 
framework, the economic development of a country mainly depends on its political 
governance and economic institutions, along with the interactions between them. In terms of 
political structures, if a type of governance can facilitate peaceful and stable social order, 
generate consensus and collective actions, and implement its policies effectively, we refer to 
it as ‘cohesive governance’; we term the absence of these qualities or their opposites 
‘conflictual governance’. For economic structures, if an institution can ensure the accessibility 
of the economy by unlocking its citizens’ willingness to participate, we refer to it as ‘access-
opening’; in contrary cases, we use the term ‘access-impeding’. This paper argues that the 
combination of cohesive political governance and an access-opening economic regime plays 
a fundamental role in the path from poverty to prosperity. Based on the number of political 
interest groups in a country, political governance will fall into one of two categories: multi-
peaked or single-peaked. Further investigation suggests that whether the political 
governance is multi-peaked or single-peaked is a neutral variable into the country’s 
continuous development. Under our framework, both the compromise-oriented multi-peaked 
and the unbiased single-peaked versions of governance can achieve cohesion and can 
support continuous economic development; conflictual multi-peaked or biased single-peaked 
governance, by contrast, will have great difficulty attaining sustainable prosperity. We will 
provide econometric evidence to this effect. 
  
This paper is organised as follows: Section 1 gives a brief review of related literature as well 
as the motivation of this study. Section 2 introduces the key concepts as well as a conceptual 
framework for the analysis in this paper, and Section 3 closely examines the development 
history of China since the Xinhai Revolution in 1911 under this framework. Section 4 
sketches a theoretical model in two steps, with three major conjectures proposed. Section 5 
provides econometric evidence for the theoretical model, with a focus on testing the three 
major conjectures. Section 6 concludes with discussion about further directions for study. 
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2 A literature review 
A huge body of literature explores the paths that poor countries pursue towards prosperity; 
increasingly, more researchers as well as policy-makers have recognised the key role of 
institutions. However, a number of fundamental questions remain unanswered. For instance, 
although it seems that most developed economies in the world adopt democratic institutions, 
does that make this institutional type a prerequisite for achieving prosperity? If so, why do 
some democratic economies still struggle with poverty, while other economies have 
witnessed long-lasting rapid growth under different institutional arrangements? In particular, 
do other fundamental factors besides political institutions influence economic performance? 
In that case, what are they, and how do they interact with economic development? 
 
The earlier literature focused on the implications of economic performance for political 
systems. For instance, when probing the causes of democratisation in his famous book, The 
Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century, Huntington (1991) points out the 
strong correlation of economic development and cultural traditions with political 
democratisation. Though Huntington was aware that economic growth alone did not suffice 
for democratisation, he indeed found a positive correlation between the degree of economic 
development and democracy. As Seymour Martin Lipset (1960) puts it in his book Political 
Man, ‘All the various aspects of economic development – industrialisation, urbanisation, 
wealth and education – are so closely interrelated as to form one major factor which has the 
political correlate of democracy.’ Robert A. Dahl (1999) also argues that ‘market-capitalism 
has typically led to economic growth; and economic growth is favourable to democracy.’ The 
core of this theory is that economic growth expands the middle class and ‘most active 
supporters of third wave democratisation came from urban middle class.’ (Dahl 1999). 
Djankov et al. (2003) hold that higher per capita income, resulting from rising human capital, 
spurs the development of institutions. Glaeser et al. (2004) emphasise how a country that 
emerges from poverty accumulates human and physical capital, and then, once it gains in 
wealth, becomes increasingly likely to improve its institutions. Therefore, institutions might be 
the outcome rather than the cause of economic growth (Barro 2000). The above-mentioned 
economic determinism arguments underscore the fundamental role of economic growth in 
providing a better basis and context for the appearance and development of a democratic 
political system. Nonetheless, they fail to answer the question of how the economy brings 
prosperity, nor do they explain what underpins continued economic growth, or why different 
economies vary widely in economic performance and other core issues. 
 
The quest to answer how an economy contributes to prosperity (and continues to grow with 
certain productive factors) has directed more and more attention to the role of institutions; 
this in turn has morphed into the influential theory of institutional determinism. Scholars of 
this view believe that institutional evolution plays a decisive role in economic growth, and 
thus holds the key to unravelling the mystery of the boom-and-bust cycle. In their book The 
Rise of the Western World, Douglass North and Robert Thomas (1976) offer an institutional-
change theory to interpret European economic history. In a nutshell, North and Thomas 
argue that the establishment of institutional arrangements and property rights created an 
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incentive to channel individual economic effort into activities that would align private returns 
with social rates of return, giving a clear definition to the ambiguous term ‘institution’ for the 
first time. Daron Acemoglu, another representative scholar, introduces measurement tools 
and game models to political economic study, examining differences in economic 
performance under varying institutions. First, Acemoglu et al. (2001) studied European 
colonialism in the 17th century, concluding that the wide differences among former European 
colonies result from the different types of institutions and policies deployed by the colonisers. 
A second study (Acemoglu et al. 2002) cited additional examples demonstrating that political 
institutions are major determinants of per capita income in former colonies. To prove the 
universality of such institutional determinism, Acemoglu et al. (2005) then examined the 
reasons for the rise of Western European countries after the 16th century. Drawing on a 
wealth of statistics and empirical validation, they signalled the key relationship between the 
economic growth of Western Europe and the institutional changes brought by transatlantic 
trade.  
 
Regarding the effect mechanism of institutional determinism, Acemoglu and Robinson (2000; 
2006) hold that different political systems may influence economic growth via attitudes 
toward the introduction of technologies. Robert D. Kaplan (2000) conducted empirical 
analysis on nations undergoing institutional transition, concluding that the shift from a non-
democratic system to democracy will improve economic efficiency. Rodrik and Wacziarg 
(2005) argue that better protection of private property and lower cost of market access will 
supply the keys to economic growth in a democratic society. In 2012, Acemoglu and 
Robinson elaborated on recent studies on institutional determinism, and improved and 
consolidated their theory in their masterpiece Why Nations Fail. In this work, they argue that 
economic and political institutions alike play a critical role in economic growth. While 
inclusive political and economic institutions boost economic growth, high-speed growth 
cannot sustain itself under extractive institutions, since they will prove unable to maintain an 
inclusive economic system in the long run. Compared to economic determinism, institutional 
determinism tries to answer which factors play a role in economic growth, but does not 
explain the reasons for institutional differences. In Why Nations Fail, Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2012) put forth the so-called ‘institutional drift’ hypothesis, which interprets initial 
formation of institutions as an external and random process. From North to Acemoglu and 
Robinson, from property theory to the influence of political and economic institutions, all 
these determinist approaches have centred on democratic politics. They believe that the 
Western democratic political system – due to its ability to use and allocate resources more 
efficiently, create incentives, and facilitate capital accumulation and technological advances – 
gives the best match for a market economy. 
 
In reality, however, Argentina, Brazil, and other Latin American countries that have instituted 
democracies have fallen short of economic growth expectations, or even found themselves 
outright stuck in growth traps. Since the dawn of the twenty-first century, Iraq, Afghanistan, 
and other Middle Eastern countries have established post-war democracies, while Arab 
countries such as Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya have overthrown established authorities and 
elected new governments since the so-called Jasmine Revolution – only to find themselves 
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mired in political struggles, corruption, armed conflicts, and terrorist attacks. Western-style 
democracy does not restore economic prosperity in these countries. In contrast, many non-
democratic East Asian economies have sustained rapid growth: Japan’s beginning with the 
Meiji Restoration, and South Korea’s taking off before the establishment of genuinely 
democratic institutions. When Taiwan first witnessed high-speed growth, the island had not 
yet put an election system in place. The era of Singapore’s economic take-off, under the 
thumb of Lee Kuan Yew and his People’s Action Party (PAP), in no sense resembles a 
genuine Western democracy. For nearly a century before the end of World War II, Japan had 
remained on the fast track without any fundamental change in its political institutions. 
Singapore still has the same political institutions as in Lee’s time. It is worth mentioning that 
since 1978, China, the most populous country in the world, has sustained a nearly four 
decades of high-speed growth under its current political institutions, which do not follow 
Western democratic models. Thus, political institutions differing from Western democracy 
can also create long-term high-speed growth and economic prosperity; this indicates that the 
Western-style democratic framework and its political institutions may mask other underlying 
mechanisms with a more profound effect on economic growth. 
 
Many researchers have explored these underlying causes in search of a deeper perspective 
on the economic role of institutions. North (1981) believes access to social organisations 
played a key role. Analysing degrees of access restriction, he differentiates between limited-
access and open-access order in natural states, and proposes three ‘doorstep’ (threshold) 
conditions for transforming the former into latter: rule of law for elites, perpetual forms of 
organisations for elites (including the state itself), and political control of the military. But 
major questions remain about the means of meeting these conditions. Other scholars have 
emphasised the influence of the political order on economies; Huntington (1991) argues that 
political stability and order created a significant setting for economic and political progress. 
Additionally, North further proposes effective economic institutions as the key to growth, 
claiming that by creating political stability, they led to the rise of the Western world. Francis 
Fukuyama (1992) shares this view, arguing that liberal democracy might be the final stage of 
humankind’s ideological evolution and the final form of human government, constituting the 
endpoint of history.  
 
However, in recent years, Fukuyama has begun to admit the importance of effective nations, 
arguing that genuine political development means striking a balance between state-building, 
the rule of law, and democracy: state-building promotes economic growth through its 
monopoly over violence and by generating the neutrality and autonomy of bureaucratic 
organisations. We would argue that it is this lack of state-building that has led to failures in 
many African countries, as well as to the debt crisis in Greece and Italy. While wars, political 
reforms, and national identity can all enhance state-building, it does not follow that more 
state-building is better, as the case of fascism demonstrates (Boduszyski and Pickard 2013). 
 
The foregoing theories have gone beyond the scope of discussions on electoral institutions 
per se, moving to a deeper level to explore the role of institutions in economies from the 
perspective of social access and social order, as well as political order stability.  
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Nonetheless, they do not explain how different institutions change into and influence one 
other dynamically; nor do they provide a convincing interpretation of the mechanisms through 
which institutional changes influence economies.  
 
Take China, for example, where it becomes apparent that institutions have had a profound 
and fundamental influence on the economy that electoral arrangements cannot explain. The 
most populous country in the world, China has gone from dire poverty to a miracle of high-
speed growth within nearly 40 years, with per capita GDP exceeding US$8,000.00.1 An 
accumulation of studies on the ‘China model’ has witnessed more and more scholars turning 
to the institutional angle for answers. Nevertheless, two divergent views have emerged on 
the relation between Chinese institutions and economic growth. The more pessimistic view 
includes Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), who offer two interpretations for the Chinese 
economic miracle, arguing that it relies on laissez-faire and new classical economics on the 
one hand and wise state intervention on the other – not a fully convincing explanation, 
however, in the absence of a rigorous definition of terms. They hold that the institutional 
basis is critical for understanding economic development and growth, and yet defined 
Chinese political institutions as ‘extractive’ and unlikely to sustain such growth long-term. 
One might also cite Huang Yasheng (2008), who does not think that the so-called China 
model exists, because Chinese development benefits from reforms favouring a market 
economy, whereas a government-dominated economic model is an unsustainable one. 
Fukuyama (2011) argues that China’s state capacity is an important condition of supporting 
economic development but that it comes with deficits in the rule of law and democracy.  
 
By contrast, Justin Yifu Lin holds a more optimistic view, pointing out (2003; 2008) that a 
country’s development strategies determine its institutional arrangements, which in the final 
analysis determine economic performance. Yao Yang (2009) proposes the concept of 
‘disinterested government’ to interpret the China model, arguing that such a government has 
broad representation, does not favour any particular group of the population, sets the long-
term welfare of the whole society as its priority, and can reject myopic demands for shorter-
term distribution from certain groups – all of which position it well for adopting pro-growth 
institutions. Yao attributes this government ‘neutrality’ to social equality, but the hypothesis 
faces increasing challenges given the rising social inequality in China; nor does Yao analyse 
the mechanics of interaction between government institutions and economic development. 
Huang Shaoan (1997) points out that given that market forces and the government now 
pursue shared goals, China has achieved full transition to a market economy. Zhou Li-An 
(2007) further argues that the long-term breakneck economic growth has the official-selection 
system to thank. The competitive system gives officials incentives to actively push the 
economy, driving overall economic growth. However, these theories have not clarified the 
relations between governmental decisions and national strategic actions and institutions, nor 
do they explain how institutions come into being and change. 
 
                                               
1  Refer to www.stats.gov.cn/english/Statisticaldata/AnnualData/, the online database of National Bureau of Statistics 
(NBS) of China. 
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This paper provides a deeper exploration of how political institutions influence economies, 
drawing on the insights of the previous studies. We believe that such institutions have two 
principal ways of influencing economic growth. First, they create conditions for the society to 
act in unity. Second, they permit other economic actors to have ready access to markets. In 
the paper, we build an index of social cohesion through related economic and political data, 
incorporating concepts such as state efficiency, which serves as another dimension for 
measuring political features beyond the traditional democratic ones in the literature. We carry 
out econometric analysis, treating per capita GDP growth rate as the explained variable. The 
findings indicate that, in a series of robustness tests based on the benchmark model, 
democracy-related index variables produce little change, while social cohesion and economic 
accessibility variables exert actual influence on per capita GDP growth rate. In addition, we 
thoroughly investigate the interactive relation between economic accessibility (as the 
economic regime) and social cohesion (as a part of the political regime), and propose a new 
perspective on the pathway of institutional influence on economies – namely that social 
cohesion (rather than the level of political democracy) and accessibility are the core factors 
influencing economic growth. 
 
3 Key concepts: an institutional analytic 
framework 
In line with the body of research literature cited above, we believe that institutions play a key 
role in economic development, and that a country’s economic performance primarily depends 
on its political governance and economic institutions, as well as the interactions between the 
two. However, scholars have not reached an agreement on the definition of these 
institutions. Under our framework, political governance refers to the distribution structure and 
operational mechanism of political power in a state – a series of actual arrangements of 
power allocation among and within state political organisations. It also comprises power 
allocation and institutional arrangements in decision-making and the formulation and 
implementation of basic institutions and rules, which lie at the heart of political governance. 
Comparing with the literature about state capacity2such as Timothy Besley and Torsten 
Persson (2009, 2010, 2011), which focus on the outcome and mechanism of the state 
capacity, one can find the concept of political governance is broader and more fundamental. 
Economic institutions mainly refer to an array of institutional arrangements that determine the 
actions and incentives of economic bodies, with the possibility and convenience of voluntary 
access to economic opportunities as their core.  
 
Specifically, we can classify political governance as either ‘conflictual’ or ‘cohesive’, based on 
whether or not it (a) permits a peaceful and stable social order to take shape, (b) can forge 
policy consensus, and (c) promotes collective actions. Fair accessibility to economic 
opportunities for different groups and regions allows us to classify economic institutions into 
                                               
2  One may refer to recent works about state capacity and its role in a country’s development by Timothy Besley and 
Torsten Persson (2009; 2010; 2011). 
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two types, namely ‘access-opening’ and ‘access-impeding’. We build a basic institutional 
analytical framework (Figure 3.1) with political governance as the horizontal coordinate and 
economic institutions as the vertical coordinate. Through the four quadrants, we can assign 
most countries in the world to one of the four categories. Cohesive political governance and 
an access-opening economy are conducive to economic growth. A country with both in 
combination can better facilitate economic growth, and has the best chance of becoming 
rich. To put it another way, if a poor country wants to become wealthy, it should try its best to 
move towards cohesive political governance and continue to enhance economic 
accessibility.  
 
Figure 3.1 An institutional framework for development 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors' own. 
 
3.1 Different types of political governance and their evolution 
3.1.1 Characteristics of two types of political governance 
Cohesive political governance is a pattern of political governance that can maintain social 
stability and order, while allowing for compromise, the forging of consensus, and the 
advancement of collective actions, all within a certain structural distribution of political power. 
It possesses at least one of the following characteristics: (1) despite differences or conflicts 
among interest groups within a country, it can find effective mechanisms for compromise and 
consensus-building and translate them into practical collective actions; (2) no apparent 
exploitation and oppression exists among different groups; (3) the government has substantial 
capacity both to enforce rules and policies and to mobilise resources; (4) development is a 
priority, complete with incentives to create and accumulate new wealth and clear and 
consistent medium- to long-term development goals; and (5) the government has a legitimate 
and impartially-applied monopoly on violence. 
 
Conflictual political governance refers to another pattern of governance, one that does not 
guarantee social order, wherein the society finds it difficult to make compromises and build 
consensus, and the structural distribution of political power does not favour collective actions. 
It possesses at least one of the following characteristics: (1) apparent conflicts exist among 
Access-opening economy II I 
Access-impeding economy III IV 
 Conflictual political 
governance 
Cohesive political 
governance 
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different interest groups within the country, whose representative social organisations can 
barely reach consensus or take joint actions; (2) one group will tend to oppress or exploit the 
others; (3) the government lacks enforcement capability and is unable to mobilise resources; 
(4) the distribution of wealth and income inventory outweighs the creation and accumulation 
of new wealth, and the government lacks a clear and consistent medium- to long-term 
development goal; and (5) the government either fails to serve as a legitimate monopolist of 
violence or routinely abuses violence.  
 
3.1.2 Evolution of political governance and its types 
Political governance originates from the evolution of organised social structures. The basic 
form of organisation is the interest group, which may systematically represent political 
parties, religions, ethnicity, regions, cultures, and occupations, among other factions. Interest 
groups constitute a foundation for basic social governance structures, in which they play 
games, come into conflict with each other, make compromises and adjustments, and even 
rise and fall via political procedures such as elections. In many cases, the conflict and 
competition among interest groups give rise to four sub-types of political governance: 
Compromise-Oriented Multi-peaked Political Governance (COMMPG), Conflictual Multi-
Peaked Political Governance (CONMPG), Unbiased Single-Peaked Political Governance 
(USPPG), and 3Biased Single-Peaked Political Governance (BSPPG). COMMPG and 
USPPG belong under cohesive political governance, while CONMPG and BSPPG fall into 
the conflicting category.  
 
Multi-Peaked Political Governance or MPPG, which we might also term diversified political 
governance, sees no dominant interest group among the small number of ‘winners,’ but 
rather a temporary balance among winning interest groups in terms of capability and power. 
Two different situations may occur under the MPPG. First, two or more interest groups 
achieve victory, find an effective mechanism for compromise (a presidential or parliamentary 
system, for instance), and reach short-term agreement to take effective collective action, 
without noticeably exploiting any other particular interest group. This is called Compromise-
Oriented Multi-Peaked Political Governance (COMMPG). The second situation is what we 
term Conflictual Multi-Peaked Political Governance (CONMPG), where the two or more 
winning interest groups fail to reach compromise or consensus, and find themselves stuck in 
long-term confrontation and conflicts. Even after they gain power to rule for a brief stint 
through election or suppression, they would adopt policies oppressing and exploiting 
adversaries. Interest groups may take turns in gaining an upper hand and perpetuating such 
policies, sowing seeds of further conflict in a vicious cycle.  
 
If only one interest group wins the competition with an overwhelming advantage over other 
interest groups with inferior organisational capacity, we term this unitary or Single-Peaked 
Political governance (SPPG). The rising single-peaked organisation may take one of two 
forms, according to which actions and interest-distribution mechanisms it deploys after 
coming to power. One is unbiased SPPG (USPPG), under which the dominant interest group 
adopts a tolerant attitude towards the previously competing and conflicting groups, and 
discards the myopic concept of interest groups and maximisation of short-term self-interest. 
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Instead, it takes a long view, weighs up the interests of other groups, and makes an effort to 
grow the economy with a view to winning support from more interest groups in the long run. 
Meanwhile, it employs an open policy for organisations of other groups. Policy 
implementation shows no obvious bias, but rather aims to benefit the majority of people. The 
winning party may reconcile divergence and conflicts among interest groups via an unbiased 
mode of conduct, so as to further strengthen support for its absolute advantage and ruling 
legitimacy. By contrast, under the biased SPPG (BSPPG), the dominant interest group 
adopts a retaliatory attitude towards those with whom it has competed or conflicted. It 
pursues the narrow interest of the group, exploits and oppresses other interest groups in an 
unfair way, redistributes social wealth and the spoils from others, or even suppresses and 
eradicates other organisations. Under these circumstances, the discrepancy among interest 
groups would not resolve itself, but would only grow wider or become subject to temporary 
control by the advantaged group. 
 
Figure 3.2 Evolution of political governance and its types
 
Source: Authors' own 
3.1.3 Cohesion: the key to high-quality political governance 
Whether a country enacts an MPPG or SPPG depends upon the evolution of particular social 
structures in its history, which we deem an exogenous variable. However, the proactive acts 
and choices of (or among) ruling political groups will decide whether the MPPG evolves into 
COMMPG or CONMPG, the SPPG into USPPG or BSPPG, or whether the MPPG and 
SPPG morph into each other. This is directly related to political legitimacy and approval 
ratings, as well as the discount function of the long-term interests of political groups. 
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In Western politics, the legitimacy of the state and enforcement authority often becomes an 
important criterion for assessing political regimes; bolstered by the social contract and 
popular sovereignty theories, legitimacy also underpins approval rates. A government and 
political governance are legitimate and lawful if they reflect the majority of votes; otherwise 
they are illegal and unlawful. This equates majority rule with legitimacy in Western politics, 
with an emphasis on procedural legitimacy. This criterion is often used to deny the legitimacy 
of the SPPG, especially when its victory does not arise from voting – an occurrence 
dismissed as lacking legitimacy by Western political standards.  
 
The emphasis on procedure may, however, mask other mechanisms through which a 
government may achieve legitimacy, whether under a Western-style democracy or another 
set of institutional arrangements. Following the insights of scholars such as Yao Dazhi (2011) 
and Yu Keping (2011), we would argue that political action should always strike a balance 
between legitimacy and effectiveness, and that most citizens share a strong interest in the 
latter – in other words, that performance and result, rather than policy or strategic choices, 
have the greatest impact on citizen perceptions of legitimacy. 
 
We assume that whether governance takes the form of the MPPG or SPPG, the objective 
function of political groups is to obtain more legitimacy and higher approval ratings; however, 
they differ in how they seek to achieve this objective. 
 
Under an MPPG, a political group might hypothetically win political power through legal yet 
questionable procedures, such as making unrealistic promises, forming political unions, or 
resorting to oppression. It might then leverage its ruling status to revise the constitution and 
political framework, or use the state apparatus for violence to suppress opponents and carry 
out policies that serve its own interests. The conflict among interest groups would then rise, 
undermining social stability and order, and economic accessibility would drop, thus hurting 
growth. There is an obvious conflict between procedural legitimacy and performance 
legitimacy. In the opposite scenario, a political group would garner as much support or as 
many votes as possible – working to win over median voters and political allies, responding 
to people’s concerns – and then assume the driver’s seat supported by legitimacy and high 
approval ratings under the existing political framework. During its administration, it would 
strive to find ways to compromise with opponents, adopt pro-growth policies, improve 
economic performance, and bring benefits to the majority (including the opponents), aligning 
procedural legitimacy with performance legitimacy. Many OECD countries fit into the second 
category. 
 
An SPPG’s legitimacy has little to do with votes, but rather stems from its actions and the 
real benefits it can bring to more citizens; in turn, they enjoy a better life and give more 
support to the government. The legitimacy is different and rests on the performance of 
political governance. The better the governance execution and the greater the number of 
beneficiaries, the more support the regime will enjoy. One does not have to be selfish to 
achieve one’s own goal; one can be selfless and pursue self-interest in the same breath. As 
the Chinese philosopher Laozi once said;  
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Heaven is long-enduring and earth continues long. The reason why heaven and earth 
are able to endure and continue thus long is because they do not live of, or for, 
themselves. This is how they are able to continue and endure. Therefore, the sage puts 
his own person last, and yet it is found in the foremost place; he treats his person as if it 
were foreign to him and yet that person is preserved. Is it not because he has no 
personal and private ends, that therefore such ends are realised?3 
(Chapter 7, Tao Te Ching) 
 
There is a household story in China about a blind man holding a lantern as he walked at 
night. When asked why he bothered with a lantern, he replied that it was for those who were 
not blind. But before someone could salute his altruism, he added that he did it so that 
people walking past could see him and keep out of his way. While a single-peaked political 
organisation fundamentally seeks to pursue self-interest, it does not necessarily do so by 
taking selfish actions or by exploiting and suppressing other interest groups. The single-
peaked interest group knows only too well that if it pursues selfish and biased actions, the 
accumulation of injustices will build to a point that prompts its opponents to rise up in 
frustration and rebellion, posing a threat to its dominant position. 
 
In addition, the interest group does not itself remain static. In the course of economic and 
social development, there are winners and losers – some becoming either richer or poorer – 
causing corresponding changes to interest groups and representations. The dominant 
interest group must prove adaptable to such changes in order to maintain its advantage. 
Therefore, under the SPPG, if the advantaged interest group has enough vision and patience 
and considers the possibility of opponents emerging, it will choose unbiased ways to improve 
growth performance, with a view to gaining permanent support and performance legitimacy. 
In the meantime, it will keep the organisation open, giving newly-established elites and 
representatives of other interest groups access to the advantaged interest group, or channels 
to speak for their interest claims. If the ruling single-peaked interest group has neither 
patience (discount rate) nor confidence in long-term ruling, the odds are that it will slide 
towards biased governance, with the ruling group attempting to maximise its own short-term 
interest at the cost of other interest groups and of the state’s long-term growth potential. This 
will obviously come at a heavy price. The ruling group will see the rise of opponents and the 
gradual fall of its political advantages, or a transition to a CONMPG. 
 
Whether or not the ruling authority is elected, or takes the form of the MPPG or SPPG, has 
no defining effect on growth performance. The key is whether the political governance is 
cohesive. Both the COMMPG (established through legitimate voting) and the USPPG 
(implementing impartial policies with performance legitimacy) create favourable conditions for 
reaching compromise and consensus, facilitating collective actions, adopting pro-growth 
measures, and enhancing economic accessibility, thus taking a poor country to prosperity. 
                                               
3  The original Chinese for this citation is ‘天长地久。天地所以能长且久者，以其不自生，故能长生。是以圣人后其身而身
先，外其身而身存。非以其无私耶？故能成其私。’ 
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An initially MPPG-style country should look to evolve into a COMMPG, while a country 
starting with the SPPG needs to work towards unbiased governance. 
 
3.2 Different types of economic institutions and mechanisms 
3.2.1 Two types of economic institutions and their characteristics 
Under our framework, the access-opening economy enables relatively easy citizen access to 
all economic opportunities, through a series of institutional arrangements around the activities 
and incentives of economic bodies. The main features include the following: (1) people can 
move freely and face few or no occupational limits based on intrinsic factors (nationality, 
gender, region, family, and others); (2) a unified domestic market exists with free flows of 
capital, goods, labour, and other factors; invisible internal barriers (such as discrimination) 
are generally eradicated, and the nation possesses a complete and functional national 
transportation network; (3) an easy climate for entrepreneurship exists, with free access to 
high-growth areas and strong protection for property rights and contracts; and (4) the 
economy participates in the global division of labour, actively explores international markets, 
and opens itself to international know-how and technologies. All in all, the access-opening 
economy is conducive to economic activities, capital accumulation, market exploration, and 
technology investment.  
 
The access-impeding economy has obvious institutional barriers: its arrangements around 
activities and incentives make it difficult for citizens to locate economic opportunities. It has 
the following features: (1) unequal access to economic opportunities, with some groups 
excluded or treated unfairly; (2) a fragmented domestic market, impeding the flow of factors, 
and an incomplete national transportation network; (3) barriers to starting businesses or 
moving to high-growth areas, with few guarantees for property rights protection and contract 
enforcement; and (4) lack of ability or willingness to take part in international divisions of 
labour, and high barriers in international trade and capital flow. Overall, the access-impeding 
economy has restraints and barriers to economic activities, and lacks incentives for 
endogenous growth, capital accumulation, and technology investment. 
 
3.2.2 Economic accessibility and its mechanism 
The industrial revolution has a close bearing on the modern phenomenon of economic 
growth. Over time, different debates have occurred on how to account for the endogenous 
growth mechanism. Overall, most scholars tend to believe that technological advances 
promote productivity and economic growth (Kuznets 1966; Rosenberg 1982; Mokyr 1990). 
The new classical growth theory attributes growth to capital accumulation (Solow 1956), 
subject to the law of diminishing marginal efficiency of capital, meaning that as capital 
intensity rises, economic growth would gradually slow down. However, this does not appear 
consistent with the phenomenon of accelerated growth as observed in developed countries 
such as the US and Germany (Romer 1986). To solve the problem, neo-growth theory has 
begun to introduce human capital and knowledge inventory into the model; it accounts for 
increasing returns to scale through the inventory externality of public knowledge, the spillover 
effect of innovative knowledge, the externality of human capital, and other factors. In other 
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words, once the economy has conducted more R&D – with concomitant accumulation of 
knowledge and human capital – the cost of further R&D will drop. Better returns to R&D 
spending can help economies continue to grow (Romer 1990; Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple 
2004).  
 
But this raises a new problem. Although the theory holds that knowledge inventory and R&D 
input determine economic growth, advanced economies that lead in R&D spending still see 
drops in productivity growth rates. The key issue in the so-called ‘R&D difficulty’ lies in the 
discrepancies in technological diffusion. Bronwyn Hall (2004) argued that the contribution of 
innovation and new technologies to economic growth depends to a large extent on the speed 
and scope of technological diffusion. In other words, advances in technology contribute to 
economic growth both through new technological inventions and the depth and width of their 
application and diffusion. Without sufficient diffusion, new technological advances would 
make few contributions to growth. 
 
The global technology frontier arises from the knowledge accumulation and common 
expansion of all countries. As a matter of fact, developing countries – which invest very little 
in R&D – obtain most of their gains from the innovations of industrial countries. Advanced 
countries must innovate in order to extend the technology frontier, while less-developed 
countries garner productivity gains by catching up to it (Helpman et al. 2004; Caselli and 
Coleman 2000). Countries at different stages of development encounter different 
opportunities for technological progress, obviously seeing varying growth rates as a result. 
Most of the latecomers can leverage the favourable conditions supplied by a host of 
existing/older technologies, adopting and applying them instead of creating new ones. 
 
Although wealth often seems a kind of absolute, in most cases it is a relative condition. 
Making a poor economy wealthy calls for technological advances, shifting the gears from a 
low-growth path to a relatively higher one, for a long enough period to create sustainability. 
Whether or not the latecomer can effectively adopt and rapidly diffuse the established 
technologies determines its growth performance. Economic accessibility plays a key role in 
the smooth adoption and diffusion of technologies.  
 
The access-opening economy includes outward and inward accessibility. Outward 
accessibility manifests as an open economy that can draw on advanced technologies, know-
how, and experience in the world; actively participate in the international division of labour; 
and explore global markets through trade and investment. Inward accessibility enables 
citizen access to economic growth, including the freedom to move, start a business, and 
locate a job, within an open environment that flows horizontally and vertically. A national 
unified market takes shape by ending fragmentation, via a transport network, tax 
arrangements, and other measures that permit free allocation of all sorts of production 
factors; these result in market access for every region and group in the country. 
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Figure 3.3 Growth path from poverty to prosperity 
Source: Authors' own 
Based on the aforementioned features of open-access economy, Figure 3.3 shows the scale 
effects of a quickened pace in adopting and applying technologies, as they impact cost, 
allocation efficiency, and accelerated diffusion. To begin with, opening up enables a poor or 
backward country to imitate, learn from, and buy new technologies from other countries at a 
relatively low cost. For better returns, the country should push technology adoption and 
diffusion to a certain scale, bringing down cost through scale effects. A late-coming country 
that ‘opens up’ has recourse to an enormous foreign market, whose purchasing power is 
naturally far larger than its own domestic market. This established international purchasing 
power can make up for the shortage in the internal market, expanding the production scale of 
exports and channelling the capital into imports of both technologies and production material 
containing new technologies. More exports will provide more citizens with opportunities for 
economic participation and rising income, and so help grow the domestic market. As the 
export scale expands, import ability strengthens and the domestic market grows; thus the 
cost of adoption and diffusion of certain technologies will come down. There is no shortage of 
proof demonstrating that international trade and deeper division of labour have played a 
major part in accelerating diffusion of new technologies. Technologies developed since 1925 
have had three times the speed of convergence of those developed before 1925 (Comin, 
Hobijn, and Rovito 2008). 
 
Second, when inward economic accessibility improves, expanding exports and imports can 
facilitate a competitive domestic market. Those sectors and enterprises that adopt new 
technologies most efficiently will reap more profits. This creates a competitive environment 
for new technology adoption and thus raises the efficiency of resource allocation. 
Additionally, under a unified market, all sorts of groups across the board can have a share in 
adopting and applying new technologies. The more that competition fosters access to new 
technologies, the faster they will diffuse through the country. The competition pressure can 
generate a knock-on effect on industrial links or chains, such that the diffusion picks up 
momentum among enterprises and industries. 
 
Global Technological Advancement Rate 
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to End Poverty) 
Landing 
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Access open 
(Accelerated Technological Diffusion) 
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Technological Advancement Rate 
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In addition, the outward and inward opening, especially the expanded production scale of 
new technologies, will increase direct labour force involvement in these sectors. The 
convergence of technologies will further accelerate through workers ‘learning by doing’, in 
addition to their conventional education. More importantly, as more enterprises and industrial 
sectors use the new technologies, the labour force will cluster in a notable way; this means 
that the urbanisation process of low-income countries will accelerate, which in turn will speed 
up the diffusion of know-how and technologies. 
 
As shown in Figure 3.4, the optimal path for a poor (backward) country is not to create one 
from zero, but to use known technologies, creating more existing products, and sparing no 
effort in expanding its cost advantage – in other words, growing from one to N. The larger 
that N grows, the lower the cost of adopting and using known technologies. Moreover, in 
creating more existing products, domestic resources and the labour force will further flow into 
the new technological sectors, thus promoting technological progress and expanding the 
domestic market in the country. This is turn will introduce a virtuous interaction between 
outward and inward opening of access.  
 
Figure 3.4 Technological path from poverty to prosperity
 
Source: Authors' own 
The access-opening economy holds the key to economic prosperity. Only when the door 
opens can the country start on the path of economic growth. Political governance plays a key 
role in locating the door and creating the step-by-step ‘opening’ conditions, subject to the 
particular form it has taken (such as COMMPG or USPPG), and by taking effective collective 
actions. It is a gradual process, and not at all the case that the wider the opening, the better. 
Once the door opens, risks and attacks may follow. How fast and wide the door should open 
depends on whether the economy can maintain conciliatory political governance, social 
stability, and order. The economic achievements made through opening up tend to foster 
political consensus, which will further break down resistance and enhance economic 
accessibility. In general, outward opening should come earlier rather than later, and on a 
wider rather than narrower scale, to allow the domestic market and citizens access to 
economic opportunities; inward opening, meanwhile, should advance in a gradual and 
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orderly manner commensurate with the country’s capability of managing risks. It is fair to 
conclude that the path to economic prosperity will see a poor country transitioning from an 
access-impeding economy to an access-opening one. 
 
3.3 Interaction between political governance and economic institutions 
Political groups further facilitate economic accessibility through political actions, such as 
legislation and policy adjustment, with a view to staying in power and maximising the returns 
for the interest groups they represent. To put it another way, promoting open economic 
accessibility is a basic means for political groups to obtain legitimacy and permanent support. 
As increased numbers benefit from the improved economic performance that accessibility 
promotes, this can raise both the ruling group’s approval ratings and their potential for long-
term governance.  
 
Under the MPPG, in order to win more votes and longer terms, the group in power on the 
one hand reinforces the support from the interest groups it represents; on the other, it strives 
to garner support for its policies from median voters, and therefore broadens the numbers 
who benefit. This political need becomes a driving force for opening economic accessibility. 
The outcome of market competition leads to changes in relations among different interest 
groups, where some emerge as winners and others lose, or some benefit while others suffer 
losses. Such changing claims require representation, leading to competition among political 
parties vying for adjustments in both political and economic markets, and to interaction 
between the COMMPG and an access-opening economy. 
 
Under the SPPG, patience for long-term governance, pressure from the rise of other 
adversary interest groups, performance legitimacy (approval ratings), and the openness of 
the dominant group constitute important conditions for steering towards unbiased SPPG. The 
discount coefficient of citizen patience for, or confidence in, long-term governance is not 
high. Facing the pressure of rising interest groups, the single-peaked group should ensure 
that there will be no serious deviation from the interests it represents. To obtain legitimacy, it 
must maximise efforts to win continued support from a greater number of people. Openness 
can guarantee a channel for elites and new interest groups to put forward their claims. The 
internal competition can ensure that the group stays clear of rigidness. Therefore, the 
legitimate pursuit of interests under the unbiased SPPG – and the openness and internal 
competition mechanism of the unbiased single-peaked group – enable changing interest 
groups and elites to express and reflect their interests, a phenomenon in harmony with the 
emergence of an access-open economy. 
 
Political competition under the COMMPG is an externalisation of political market competition, 
while an open unbiased single-peaked group is an internalisation of political market 
competition. The preference for one over the other depends on the relative capacity for 
reaching political compromise and the relative cost of promoting collective actions. The lower 
the cost, the more economic growth will see the benefits.  
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Under this framework (Figure 3.1), most of the countries in the world fit into one of the four 
categories. Cohesive political governance and an access-opening economy are more 
conducive to economic growth. Countries with these characteristics have a better chance of 
continuing to grow their economies and becoming wealthy. Some additional conditions 
should also apply: (1) Continuous economic growth requires a society based on effective 
organisation. Neither anarchy nor a heap of loose sand can sustain growth; (2) An organised 
society has the means to achieve compromise, establish peaceful and stable social orders, 
and take collective actions to form cohesive political governance (such as the COMMPG and 
USSPG), thus providing incentives for economic growth; (3) The country should adopt an 
access-opening economy, gradually removing the obstacles to economic-factor and market 
access in an orderly fashion, with the speed and sequence suited to concrete national 
conditions; (4) Given that the markets of poor countries seldom function well and that no 
market can improve by itself, governments have a key role to play in establishing the market 
system, supporting its development, and upholding its order. The relation between the 
market and government does not rest on one replacing the other, nor one simply fixing the 
other’s faults. The bigger the market and the more complicated the transactions, the stronger 
and bigger the government should be. The government and market help each other move 
forward. Sustained economic growth needs development-oriented and market-augmenting 
government; and (5) A mutually beneficial relation between market and political governance 
offers several development paths. For the path of ⅢⅡⅠ, the country will prioritise 
enhanced economic accessibility, laying the economic groundwork for cohesive political 
governance. If the country puts cohesive political governance before economic reform with a 
view to promoting sustainable economic growth, it can choose the path of ⅢⅣI. In most 
cases, the country emphasises both cohesive political governance and enhanced economic 
accessibility in order to move towards the first type, i.e., the path of ⅢⅢ/ⅣⅠ. 
 
4 The mode of China’s growth under the 
framework 
China’s economic growth over the past four decades has always been viewed as a miracle; 
however, what has brought about this miracle remains a mystery, and numerous scholars 
have attempted to explain this mystery using various theories. Based on the analytical 
framework proposed above, we can summarise China’s growth mode as follows: After a 
difficult journey from the conflictual multi-peaked governance to the unbiased single-peaked 
governance, and a transition from an access-impeding economy to an access-opening 
economy, the combination of the unbiased single-peaked governance and an access-
opening economy makes the high-speed growth of China over 40 years, leading the country 
from an impoverished country to a rich one gradually. 
 
4.1 Political governance: from multi-peaked to single-peaked 
Looking back at China’s political governance mode since 1911, we can identify two major 
trajectories from the complex historical changes. The first one is the continuous convergence 
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from multiple peaks to a single peak, and at the same time, it is also a winding process of 
moving from conflicts towards compromises. Under these two trajectories, we can divide 
China’s political governance mode since 1911 into the following five stages. 
 
4.1.1 Disintegration of autocratic monarchy and formation of a conflictual multi-
peaked society (1911–1916) 
With the outbreak of the Xinhai Revolution in 1911, the last Qing emperor abdicated, which 
marked the collapse of the last highly autocratic and centralised monarchy in China. 
Following a short period of conflicts and disintegration, a unified Republic of China was 
founded through the peace negotiation between the South and North, with Yuan Shikai 
maintaining the ostensible unity of China. However, after Yuan passed away in 1916, the 
Beiyang army fractured into competing factions, including Zhili clique and Anhui clique. 
Meanwhile, Shanxi, Guizhou, and Yunnan provinces were controlled by local warlords, and 
regional military skirmishes became frequent. Although the Beiyang government and the 
state were nominally under civilian control under a constitution, the Beiyang generals were 
effectively in charge of it, with various factions vying for power. In other words, the social 
structure of the autocratic monarchy had completely collapsed at this point, and a conflictual 
multi-peaked society was already in its rudimentary form in China. 
 
4.1.2 A difficult journey from CONMPG to COMMPG (1916–1945) 
Between 1916 and 1926, China manifested the quintessential characteristics of a conflictual 
multi-peaked society. There were continuous clashes among different interest groups, and 
they were unable to reach a common agreement, which made it even harder for them to take 
collective actions. Within the Peking Nationalist Government, there had always been two 
factions: the pro-Japanese faction led by Duan Qirui and the pro-US faction led by Li 
Yuanhong. The two factions had different agendas in a number of areas, and had an 
enormous disagreement on whether China should be involved in the First World War. On 
these issues, the two factions opposed each other and made no compromises, and collective 
decision-making was almost impossible. During this period, there were a number of conflicts 
and wars, including the National Protection War (1915–16), the Manchu Restoration4 (1917), 
the war between Zhili and Anhui cliques (1920), the two wars between Zhili and Fengtian 
cliques (1922 and 1924), and Feng Yuxiang’s coup in Beijing (1924). Besides, the united 
power of workers and peasants, represented by the Chinese Communist Party (CPC), had 
also emerged. 
 
Before the Northern Expedition, Sun Yat-sen proposed the New Three Principles of the 
People, which advocated ‘collaboration with the Soviet Union and collaboration with the 
Communists’ and ‘helping the workers and peasants’5. On the First National Congress of 
Kuomintang (KMT) in 1924, the first KMT-CPC Cooperation was established. In 1926, the 
Northern Expedition led by the Nationalist government started and many great progresses 
                                               
4  The Manchu Restoration of July 1917 was an attempt to restore monarchy in China by General Zhang Xun, whose army 
seized Beijing and briefly reinstalled the last emperor of the Qing dynasty, Puyi, to the throne. The restoration lasted only 
a few days, from July 1 to July 12, and was quickly reversed by Republican troops. 
5  It’s a brief summary of the New Three Principles of the People, and was first seen in Chen Duxiu's Report on the 
Kuomintang Problem in 1926, two years after the Sun ‘s New Three Principles of the People 
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were achieved. In the first year, the Nationalist Revolutionary Army (NRA) annihilated many 
southern warlords, including Sun Chuanfang and Wu Peifu. On April 18th, 1927, the Nanjing 
Nationalist Government was established, and in July of the same year, the Wuhan 
Nationalist Government and Nanjing Nationalist Government were united. In 1928, the NRA 
defeated the Fengtian clique and took control of Beijing and Tianjin, which forced the 
Fengtian clique to retreat to the northeastern area. After the Huanggutun incident, the leader 
of the Fengtian clique, Zhang Xueliang, declared the allegiance of his Northeast Army to the 
Nationalist government in Nanjing. In 1930, Shanxi warlord Yan Xishan and northwest 
warlord Feng Yuxiang jointly fought against Chiang Kai-shek – that is the Central Plains War. 
The war ended with Chiang’s final victory, and his ruling position was also established. Thus, 
the Nationalist government achieved the unification of China. Even though this unification did 
not substantially change the fact that the regional warlords were still relatively independent, 
and thus, the multi-peaked structure remained, the different interest groups now had a 
channel for negotiation under the leadership of the Nanjing Nationalist government, and the 
government was able to extend its actual mobilisation capacity to the whole nation.  
 
Under the compromise-oriented multi-peaked structure, the Chinese social and economic 
development recovered rapidly. Between 1931 and 1936, the average industrial growth rate 
of China reached 9.3 per cent, and industries including transportation, telecommunication, 
and postal services developed quickly, with more than 20,000 kilometers of railroad and 
more than 80,000 kilometers of road constructed. During the period from 1927 to 1937, 
twelve flight courses were opened, with the total distance of over 15,000 kilometers. 
Education also witnessed great development between 1931 and 1937, with the number of 
primary school students increasing by 86 per cent and college students by 94 per cent. 
Meanwhile, the banking industry also demonstrated rapid growth. From 1928 to 1931, 23 
new banks were opened in Shanghai. The total asset of the 28 major banks in China 
increased from 1.391 billion yuan in 1926 to 2.569 billion yuan in 1931.6 In 1935, the 
Nationalist Government implemented a radical currency reform program – the legal currency 
must be used for all tax payments, public and private funds, and commercial transactions, 
while silver and silver coins were no longer acceptable. From the start of the reform program 
to the eve of the Lugou Bridge Incident (also known as the ‘Marco Polo Bridge Incident’) in 
1937, the money supply kept growing steadily, the domestic price level remained stable and 
hence the purchasing power increased steadily. Moreover, people’s saving kept 
accumulating, and investment in both industrial and agricultural sectors rose sharply. In 
addition, the stability in exchange rate also boosted international trade, with exports growing 
rapidly and the trade deficit shrinking drastically. In general, the national economy was 
showing promising momentums. During this period, although there are still many conflicting 
military and political interest groups, the Nanjing Nationalist Government achieved, to a 
certain extent, collective actions based on some consensus among different groups. The 
economic development was fair, and domestic conflicts were largely under control. The 
Chinese society demonstrated a brief trend of transitioning from a conflicting multi-peaked 
structure to a compromised multi-peaked structure. 
                                               
6  Refer to Feuerwerker, A. (1983). Economic trends, 1912–49. In J. Fairbank (Ed.), The Cambridge History of China (The 
Cambridge History of China, pp. 28-127). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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Objectively speaking, the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War had significant impact 
on the formation of the consensus. On the one hand, the Japanese army invaded China from 
Manchuria to the South7 and encountered great challenges before reaching the Yangzi river 
region. They destroyed the local military powers along their path of invasion, which 
challenged the multi-peaked structure in some sense. On the other hand, the collective 
desire to fight against the invader and protect the homeland helped to unite the domestic 
classes and powers. Many forms of cooperation, including the second KMT-CPC 
Cooperation and the United Front,8 emerged. Although China was still in the war, it was 
moving towards the direction of social reconciliation. In 1945, the negotiation about founding 
a coalition government between the CPC and Kuomintang took place in Chongqing. Up to 
this point, a compromise-oriented multi-peaked structure was finally about to take shape in 
the war-damaged China.  
 
4.1.3 Formation of a single-peaked society and efforts from biased governance to 
unbiased governance (1945–1957) 
However, China did not continue on the path to a compromise-oriented multi-peaked society. 
The Double Tenth Agreement9 between KMT and CPC was soon torn up, and from June 
1946 onwards, violent military clashes started to break out in many regions, including Henan 
and Hubei provinces, which evolved into a full-scale civil war between the two parties. The 
People’s Liberation Army led by the CPC gradually shifted from its early defensive strategy to 
a more aggressive one and achieved decisive victories in the three famous battles, and thus, 
achieved the unification of mainland China. After the Chinese Civil War between 1946 and 
1949, the Communist regime was established in mainland China.  
 
As the CPC founded the People’s Central Government, the single-peaked governance mode 
became the main characteristic of political governance. After the founding of the People’s 
Republic of China, the CPC created a highly centralised model of governance, including the 
Party, the Army, and the Government. Primary party organisations were set up inside the 
local governments, military units, and other organisations to lead these entities. Within the 
CPC, centralised decision-making was implemented through democratic centralism. 
Meanwhile, the grass-roots social structure was also adjusted during the subsequent 
socialist reforms. Through people’s communes, production teams, and primary party 
organisations, the Communist government obtained the capability to mobilise people and 
resources across the whole country. As the political governance system where the CPC has 
the absolute authority was formed, a single-peaked political governance mode was also 
established gradually. 
 
                                               
7  In 1931, the Japanese army invaded Manchuria. The Chinese were defeated and Japan created a new puppet state, 
Manchukuo. Many historians and the PRC government cite 1931 as the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War. 
8  The simplest formulation of United Front work in the early period was to ‘rally as many allies as possible in order to... 
defeat a common enemy.’ 
9  The Double Tenth Agreement, formally known as the Summary of Conversations between the Representatives of the 
Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China, was an agreement between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party 
of China that was concluded on 10 October 1945, after 43 days of negotiations. 
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During the development of the single-peaked governance mode in the People’s Republic of 
China, the CPC also underwent a transition from biased governance to unbiased 
governance. At the early stage of the CPC, the Party focused on the working and peasant 
classes and set its goal on overthrowing the landowners and the bourgeois class. The Party 
had relatively low tolerance for different classes and groups, and it is extremely biased. 
Fortunately, as the domestic circumstances changed, the CPC had kept adjusting its actual 
practices for self-development, emphasising the unification of different groups and the 
resolution of their conflicts, and promoting the formation of consensus for the realisation of 
common goals. Meanwhile, by setting up new primary party organisations and political 
commissars, the CPC was able to extend its influence to the grass-roots organisations and 
achieved strong mobilisation capability. During this stage, the CPC demonstrated the 
characteristic of transitioning from a biased party to an unbiased party. After the first Chinese 
People’s Political Consultative Conference in 1949,10 this unbiasedness became 
increasingly evident. The first article of the Common Program of the Chinese People’s 
Political Consultative Conference dictates that; 
 
The People’s Republic of China is a New Democratic or a People’s Democratic state. It 
carries out the people’s democratic dictatorship led by the working class, based on the 
alliance of workers and peasants, through uniting all democratic classes and all ethnic 
groups in China. It opposes imperialism, feudalism and bureaucratic capitalism and strives 
for independence, democracy, peace, unity, prosperity and strength of China.11  
To some extent, one can see the CPC’s vision of building an unbiased governance mode 
from this article. 
 
After the CPC stabilised the internal political power, the government began to push forward 
the ‘three transformations’ to reform the existing private ownership in agriculture, handicraft 
business, and capitalist industrial and commercial sectors. Since the reforms involved the 
most basic property right issues, conflicts and clashes were inevitable. However, through 
effective internal negotiations and reasonable arrangements, the government adopted a 
series of transitional policies, including agricultural cooperation and asset buyout. With the 
tremendous mobilisation capability, the ‘three transformations’ were completed in just three 
years. On the 8th National Congress of the CPC in 1956, it was pointed out that;  
 
as the socialist system has been basically established in China, the principal 
contradiction within the country was no longer the contradiction between the proletariat 
and the bourgeoisie but the one resulted from the need of the people for rapid economic 
and cultural development which fell short of their requirements. The chief task 
confronting the entire nation was to concentrate all efforts on developing the productive 
                                               
10  In 1949, with the Communist Party having gained control of most of mainland China, they organised a ‘new’ Political 
Consultative Conference in September, inviting delegates from various friendly parties to attend and discuss the 
establishment of a new state. This conference was then renamed the People’s Political Consultative Conference. The 
first conference approved the Common Program, which served as the de facto Constitution for the next five years. The 
conference approved the new national anthem, flag, capital city, and state name, and elected the first government of the 
People’s Republic of China. In effect, the first People’s Political Consultative Conference served as a constitutional 
convention. 
11  It was seen in Common Program of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, the version we used here is 
from The CPC Central Committee's Suggestions on Revising Part of the Constitution, China Legal Publishing House, 
2004, p110. 
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forces, industrializing the country and gradually meeting the people’s growing economic 
and cultural needs. 
(Source: http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/206972/206981/8188361.html) 
 
Evidently, economic development had replaced class struggles and became the focal point in 
the work of the Party and the nation. In 1957, China’s First Five-Year Plan (1953–57) was 
completed in advance, with a complete industrial system built up and the nation’s economy 
growing rapidly.  
 
Up to this point, the democratic consultation and democratic centralism supported the 
political inclusiveness, the ruling party had a strong ability to mobilise resources, the 
government was participating in social and economic development actively, with clear goals 
and plans, and there was no serious discrimination or deprivation among different sectors of 
the society. All in all, under the leadership of the CPC, the People’s Republic of China had 
begun to have the embryonic form of an unbiased single-peak governance. 
 
4.1.4 Interruption of the unbiased single-peaked governance and development of 
biased governance (1957–1978) 
The progress of China’s unbiased single-peaked governance did not last long. In 1957, the 
Anti-Rightist Movement started and soon escalated, and the prevention of the restoration of 
the bourgeois class became the main task. The escalation of the movement made class 
struggle the focal point of political work. Based on the comprehensive and detailed reviews 
and statistics following the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee shows 
that there were about 550,000 people labeled as rightists, and they suffered various types of 
discrimination within their organisations. They were deprived of many opportunities including 
education and employment, and oftentimes, their personal safety and their property 
ownership were also threatened. In addition, their family, friends and offspring were also 
affected. At this point, the CPC’s policy returned to focusing on class struggle, and the 
conflicts among different social groups kept escalating. Due to the class struggle, China’s 
unbiased single-peaked governance shifted towards biased singled-peaked governance. 
Since the escalation of the anti-rightist movement, CPC’s internal thinking became 
increasingly leftist, and eventually led to the Socialist Education Movement12 and the 
Cultural Revolution.  
 
Guided by the philosophy about ‘continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the 
proletariat’, the Cultural Revolution primarily targeted at the ‘persons in power within the 
party taking the capitalist road’ (for short, ‘capitalist-roaders’) and the ‘bourgeois reactionary 
academic authority’, and promoted the ‘great political revolution of one class overthrowing 
another’. The Cultural Revolution, which lasted from 1966 to 1976, brought about disastrous 
damage to the nation’s development and people’s life. In the context of class struggle, the 
target of the dictatorship of the proletariat was continuously expanding, and social 
                                               
12  The Socialist Education Movement, also known as the Four Cleanups Movement, was a movement launched by Mao 
Zedong in 1963 in the People’s Republic of China. The goal of the movement was to cleanse politics, economy, 
organisation, and ideology (the four cleanups). 
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discrimination and suppression were unnecessarily deepened, with numerous party 
members, intellectuals, scientists, and cultural workers persecuted. Moreover, the 
government almost became paralysed, and the nation’s legislation and judiciary were greatly 
impacted. According to statistics (Wang 2009), 75 per cent of the central and national 
officials above the vice-ministerial class plus the local and provincial senior officials were 
investigated, including Liu Shaoqi, Peng Dehuai, Chen Yi, He Long, Tao Zhu, and Luo 
Ruiqing, all of whom suffered a lot and even paid their lives. During the decade of chaos, the 
total number of people who suffered persecution exceeded 100 million (Ye 1978).13 The 
Cultural Revolution also caused serious damage to the nation’s economy. As Li Xiannian 
released on the National Planning Conference held in December 1979,14 the loss of national 
income caused by the Cultural Revolution during the 10 years was estimated to amount to 
500 billion yuan, which is equivalent to 80 per cent of the total amount of infrastructure 
investment over the 30 years since the founding of People’s Republic of China, and exceeds 
the total of national fixed assets over the same 30 years. The emergence of the biased 
single-peaked social structure disrupted the development process under the unbiased single-
peaked governance after the Korean War. 
 
4.1.5 The restart and recent development of the unbiased single-peaked governance in 
China (since 1978) 
The Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee was held in December 1978, 
and it symbolised the restart of unbiased single-peaked governance, after two decades of 
biased governance. After the meeting, the CPC brought things back to order from the chaotic 
Cultural Revolution and returned to their original ideological, political, and organisational lines 
– the wrongfully convicted ‘rightists’ got vindicated, and the party and the government shifted 
their focus from class struggle to economic development. More importantly, various social 
sectors reached a consensus on the series of challenges and social issues that China was 
faced with – the biased line resulting from political discrimination and lack of coordination 
was abandoned, and more social groups were absorbed to serve for the nation’s 
development. 
 
Firstly, the dynamics of the number and composition of the CPC members indicate evidently 
that the CPC has been developing along two directions – greater openness and wider social 
representativeness. When the CPC was first established in 1921, there were only 53 
members. The number reached 4.448 million when the People’s Republic of China was 
founded in 1949. By the end of 2016, the number has reached 89.447 million.15 As for the 
composition, at the early stage of the CPC, most members were workers. For instance, there 
were 57,967 party members in 1927, and 50.8 per cent of them were workers, with 18.7 per 
cent peasants, 19.1 per cent intellectuals, 3.1 per cent military personnel, 0.5 per cent small 
and medium business owners, and the rest 7.8 per cent. However, as the Great Revolution 
                                               
13  Ye Jianying stated on the Closing Meeting of the Central Work Conference on 31 December 1978, that ‘more than 100 
million people suffered, including those who were implicated, and it is one-ninth of China’s total population. This is a very 
painful lesson.’  
14  Li Xiannian’s speech on the National Planning Conference, 20 December 1979. Li Xiannian Selected Works, People's 
Publishing House,1989, pp.395-409. 
15  Data sources: http://en.people.cn/n3/2017/0630/c90000-9235562.html, Organization Department of the CPC Central 
Committee. 
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in 1927 failed, the CPC was forced to find its roots in the rural areas, and the majority of the 
party members became peasants during the land reform era. When the 6th National 
Congress of the CPC was held in 1928, peasants made up 76.6 per cent of the more than 
40,000 party members while the workers’ percentage dropped to 10 per cent. The 
percentage of workers fell to as low as 1.6 per cent in 1930. This composition where 
peasants made up the majority remained until the founding of the People’s Republic of 
China. During the Sino-Japanese War and the Chinese Civil War, military party members 
became the second largest category, with the percentage of military party members reaching 
24 per cent in 1949. After the People’s Republic of China was founded, the percentage of 
workers in the party gradually rose up, and it reached 8.8 per cent in 1956. Since China’s 
reform and opening-up, the composition of the CPC members became more diversified, with 
a great number of intellectuals, professionals, and private enterprises absorbed into the 
party. Elites from the newly emerged economic and social organisations were also recruited 
into the Party. According to the latest statistics16 at the end of 2016, out of the 89.447 million 
party members, workers account for 7.9 per cent, peasants 29.0 per cent, business owners 
and employees 25.2 per cent, government officials 8.5 per cent, retired personnel 18.9 per 
cent, and students and other occupations 10.5 per cent. In terms of gender structure, 25.7 
per cent of the members are female. In addition, 7.0 per cent of the 89.447 million members 
come from minority ethnic groups. Among the non-public sector enterprises, 67.9 per cent of 
them had established primary party organisations. Out of the 4.518 million primary party 
organisations in the CPC, 41 per cent, or 1.855 million, were established by non-public 
sector enterprises. It is evident that the CPC has moved gradually from only representing 
certain class or groups during its early days to representing the collective interests of the 
society. 
 
Secondly, the evolution of the party’s governance philosophy indicates that the CPC, at the 
centre of the single-peaked governance, has also shifted gradually from being biased to 
being unbiased. On June 27, 1981, the 6th Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central 
Committee passed the Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of our Party since the 
Founding of the People’s Republic of China. This marked the Chinese government, led by 
the CPC, was comprehensively correcting their deviated political governance. The 13th 
National Congress of CPC in 1987 put forward the basic line of the Party for the primary 
stage of socialism, that is; 
 
to lead the people of all ethnic groups in a concerted, self-reliant and pioneering effort to 
turn China into a prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious 
modern socialist country by making economic development the central task while 
upholding the Four Cardinal Principles and the reform and opening up policy.17 
 (CPC Central Literature Research Office 1991) 
 
                                               
16  Data sources: Same as above. 
17  CPC Central Literature Research Office, Follow the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics (Zhao Ziyang’s 
Speech in 1987) , Selection of important documents since the 13th National Congress, 1991, People's Publishing 
House, p59. 
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This further established the Party’s political inclination towards unbiased development. In 
1992, Deng Xiaoping proposed the ‘Three Favorable Circumstances’ during his southern 
tour, and made ‘how it benefits development of the productive forces in China’s socialist 
society, adds to the overall strength of socialist China and improves the people’s living 
standards’ as the general starting point and criterion for judging all the Party’s work. The 
‘Three Favorable Circumstances’ cleared people’s doubts about whether the Chinese society 
is a capitalist one or socialist one, and it re-focused the society’s attention onto economic 
development. As a result, more social resources and forces were mobilised. In 2000, Jiang 
Zemin proposed the important thought of ‘Three Represents’ during an inspection tour in 
Maoming, Guangdong province, that is, ‘the Communist Party of China should always be 
representative to advanced social productive forces, advanced culture, and the interests of 
the overwhelming majority.’18 The ‘Three Represents’ expanded the representativeness of 
the CPC by a further step and united social forces in a greater range. In 2003, Hu Jintao 
proposed the ‘Scientific Outlook on Development’, which set ‘comprehensive, balanced and 
sustainable development’ as the goal and gave priority to ‘people-oriented’ governance. This 
is the continuation of the CPC’s efforts on the path of unbiased governance. In 2012, Xi 
Jinping, general secretary of the Central Committee of the CPC, proposed the ‘Chinese 
Dream’, and he defined it as ‘the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’, which is ‘the 
greatest dream of the Chinese people in the recent history of China’. Furthermore, Xi 
interpreted it as ‘the common dream of 1.4 billion of Chinese people’, which further 
emphasised the importance of putting people at the centre of the nation’s development.  
 
According to both the dynamics of the composition of the CPC members and the evolution of 
the party’s governance philosophy since the reforms and opening-up, one can find that the 
CPC has realised the primary transition from biased single-peaked governance to unbiased 
single-peaked governance. And this kind of unbiased single-peaked governance has become 
an important consensus for political and social governance. During this period of four 
decades of reforms and opening-up, China witnessed the significant effects of the political 
governance transition from being biased towards being unbiased, with rapid social and 
economic development. Through the unbiased single-peaked governance, the CPC devoted 
more social forces and resources into the process of economic development, and the 
reforms benefited all social groups, which generated greater public support to the Communist 
government, facilitated collective social decision-making, and prompted collective actions. 
Moreover, China’s social inclusiveness grew continuously, and the government’s policies 
benefited more and more people, which help to accumulate strength for further reforms. At 
the same time, coordination and conflict resolution mechanisms are playing their important 
roles under the current political system, and the government still has the capability to push 
collective actions and mobilise resources effectively. In 2016, China’s per capita GDP 
exceeded 8,000 US dollars (current price) and 13,000 Geary-Khamis dollars in purchasing 
                                               
18  The formal statement of the theory is: ‘This experience and the historical experiences gained by the Party since its 
founding can be summarised as follows: Our Party must always represent the requirements for developing China’s 
advanced productive forces, the orientation of China’s advanced culture and the fundamental interests of the 
overwhelming majority of the Chinese people. These are the inexorable requirements for maintaining and developing 
socialism, and the logical conclusion our Party has reached through hard exploration and great praxis.’ (Source: Jiang 
Zemin’s work report at the 16th CPC Congress, 8 November 2002) 
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power parity (PPP) terms, showing that China is moving towards a high-income country from 
a middle-income country.  
 
Through revisiting the dynamics of China’s political governance over the past century, one 
can see two main trajectories vividly: one is the evolution from a multi-peaked mode to a 
singled-peaked mode and the second is the difficult journey from a conflictual mode to a 
compromise-oriented mode. Putting the historical background and details aside, we can find 
that China’s evolution from multi-peaked governance to single-peaked governance is 
consistent with China’s political and cultural traditions as well as Chinese people’s national 
identity over the past two thousand years. It is also closely connected to the desire for 
unification, which is full of national sentiment and native land emotion. In this sense, this 
trajectory is filled with the features of oriental political civilisation, and this may differ across 
different countries and nations in the world. However, the journey from conflict to 
compromise is more about human’s desire for stability and order, hope of communication, 
and internal longing for changing the world and creating better lives. The pursuit of a 
compromise-oriented society radiates the light of humanity, and it should be the universal 
value for all races, regions, and nations. 
 
4.2 From an access-impeding economy to an access-opening one 
China’s economic take-off started from the reforms and opening-up, coupled with the 
transition from a planned economy to a market economy. Theoretically, the planned 
economy does not conflict with the access-opening economy. If there is sufficient 
information, the planned economy can allocate resources efficiently and ensure the 
accessibility to external economies, internal markets, and various groups. However, there is 
no such central planner with complete information in reality, and therefore it is difficult to 
allocate capital to the most effective productions, allocate workers to the most appropriate 
job positions, or find the optimal proportions and relationships in the economic structure. 
Thus, in practice, the planned economy would inevitably be faced with hindrance to 
economic access, and this would lead to low economic operation efficiency, distorted 
proportions, and shortage of supply. The planned economy based on the public ownership of 
factors of production denies commodity economy, market, private ownership, and price 
mechanism. China’s transition from a planned economy to a market economy is essentially 
the process of the re-opening economic access to individuals, enterprises, and domestic and 
international markets. One can follow the four clues below to examine the transition. 
  
4.2.1 From the people’s commune to the household-responsibility system: economic 
access to peasants was opened 
Soon after its founding, the People’s Republic of China launched a series of socialist reforms 
through taking the Soviet Union as a model. In 1957, China began to adopt the collective 
economic system, where the people’s commune and government were integrated. Under this 
system, the nation monopolised the purchase and sale of agricultural products, and the 
farmers had no autonomy during the production. Moreover, a fixed work-rewarding regime, 
called the ‘work-point regime’, was adopted in most places – people got rewarded based on 
the number of work points, which is calculated based on the number of working days, age, 
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gender, and other factors. In general, people of similar ages and of the same gender 
received the same work-point standard – each working day represents a fixed amount of 
work points. Hence, this rewarding regime could not serve as an effective incentive 
mechanism to the members of the commune (peasant households), which made it hard to 
increase agricultural productivity. In addition, the people’s commune system was essentially 
a typical dualistic social structure with a division between the urban and the rural areas. Due 
to the restrictions of the household registration system, the food coupon system, and the 
food ration system, the peasants completely lost their right to freely allocate their wealth and 
labour (Wu 2003). The people’s commune and the production teams decided what to 
produce, how much to produce, and how to produce. The peasants had no freedom of 
mobility, since visiting other cooperatives, shopping in the cities, and even visiting relatives 
and friends required some approval, referred to as an introduction letter, which needed to be 
approved by the officials of the village or the commune. Under this circumstance, economic 
accessibility was greatly impeded.  
 
In fact, many people saw the disadvantages of the people’s commune system when the 
system was first implemented. Some villages in Zhejiang, Anhui, and Sichuan provinces 
volunteered to introduce measures such as ‘household contract system’, under which 
peasants were paid or rewarded based on their total production. However, during the ‘anti-
rightist movement’ and the escalation of the movement, these measures to liberate 
productivity were banned. Until the end of the Cultural Revolution, 18 households in 
Xiaogang village, Fengyang County, Anhui Province, took risk and signed a contract with 
local cadres in November 1978. The cadres secretly allowed farmers to produce by 
household and if the cadres were punished for this, the farmers agree to take care of the 
families of the cadres. And the secret experiment proved very successful. Unlike previously, 
and especially after the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee in 1978, 
the political trends had changed, and the local and central officials held a more supportive 
attitude towards those measures. In 1979 similar experiments began in Sichuan and Anhui 
provinces, both seeing dramatic increases in agricultural productivity. Deng Xiaoping openly 
praised these experiments in 1980, and the Household-Responsibility System was adopted 
nationwide soon, and the system of collective operation and allocation by the production 
teams was abolished. The Household-Responsibility System, or the ‘big contract system’, 
has become the basic economic system for rural China. Through reforming the rural 
economic system, the transition from people’s commune to the Household-Responsibility 
System was realised. The freedom of production and mobility was returned to the peasants 
while the collective economy was reserved. This released the farmers’ enthusiasm greatly, 
and it resulted in increases in both agricultural income and agricultural productivity. And it 
also helped to improve the peasants’ living standards. Moreover, this also created the 
conditions for maintaining the overall stability of the rural society and for peasants’ 
participation in non-agricultural production with abundant agricultural labour freed up. 
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4.2.2 From class exploitation to entrepreneurial spirit: access to entrepreneurs was 
opened gradually 
During the Cultural Revolution, to alleviate urban employment pressure and cultivate the 
revolutionary spirits in the rural areas, many educated youths responded to the call of 
Chairman Mao, and ‘went to the villages to receive re-education from the poor and lower-
middle peasants’. The movement of educated youth ‘to go and work in the countryside or 
mountain areas’ distributed the urban employment pressure to a large number of villages. 
When the Cultural Revolution ended, around 20 million ‘sent-down’ educated youths returned 
to the cities and exerted tremendous pressure to cities without supporting industries. The 
large amount of unemployed youths imposed great pressure to social stability, and the 
government was forced to gradually open up individual industrial and commercial units as 
well as private enterprises so as to allow the unemployed youths to find their own ways of 
survival. The market economy began to grow in the corner of the state economy and the 
collective economy. The youths who started their own business at that time became China’s 
first batch of entrepreneurs. Meanwhile, with the promotion of the Household-Responsibility 
System in the rural areas, the people’s communes were dismissed, and many previous 
commune officials considered their original commune enterprises as a good place to stay 
(Coase 2012), and this gave birth to the township and village enterprises under the rural 
collective economic system. In 1978, more than 28 million peasants, about 9.5 per cent of 
the total rural workforce, worked in township and village enterprises that were converted from 
previous commune enterprises (Wu 1999). These township and village enterprises have 
some natural advantages over the state-owned enterprises (SOEs). For instance, they were 
overlooked by the governments, and thus received little intervention from bureaucratic 
agencies. These enterprises were not included in the nation’s industrial production plans, 
and they were able to determine the use of their profits. In this sense, the township and 
village enterprises were market-oriented from the very beginning. Additionally, most of 
employees in these enterprises were farmers from nearby villages, particularly the surplus 
labour forces freed up by the Household-Responsibility System, and thus, hiring and firing 
were rather flexible. The performance-based rewarding system, including bonuses and wage 
rates, was adopted by the township and village enterprises at a very early stage. 
 
Moreover, due to the heavy industry-centred policies, the light manufacturing industries were 
neglected, and there was a continuous shortage of light manufacturing products. The 
township and village enterprises, limited by their capital and technology, targeted at this 
shortage from the beginning, and produced goods according to the market demand. These 
factors stimulated the rapid development of the township and village enterprises, and these 
enterprises accounted for 26 per cent of China’s GDP at their peak in 1996, 56.1 per cent of 
gross industrial output, and employed around 135 million people (Lin Yifu and Yao 2001; 
Naughton 2007). More than 80 per cent of these township and village enterprises later 
became private enterprises.  
 
As Deng Xiaoping once said, ‘Among the rural reforms, what we achieved totally unexpected 
is the development of the township and village enterprises. All in a sudden, we have got 
many types of sectors committed to commodity economy and many different types of small 
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enterprises. The unexpected emergence of these new forces cannot be credited to the 
central government.’ It is true that the unexpected fast growth of the individual economy, the 
private economy, and the township and village enterprises was not a result of the design of 
China’s government system, but the overall open-minded attitudes of the government 
towards these new economic bodies, in some sense, was an attempt to open the economic 
access to private entrepreneurs. The unexpected development encouraged the subsequent 
rapid growth of China’s entrepreneurship. In turn, the great vitality of the private enterprises 
and the township and village enterprises further enhanced China’s determination and 
confidence to reform and expand its economic access. For instance, the reform of 
‘decentralisation of power and transfer of profits’ was also implemented within the state-
owned enterprises, and the job position allocation regime for college and university students 
was also reformed to a self-choice regime. All of these reforms helped to open up wider 
access to various economic participants. 
 
4.2.3 From an inward economy to an export-oriented economy: the access to 
international markets was opened 
After the Cultural Revolution, the Cold War mind-set was shattered, and China gradually 
opened its long-shut door to the international society. In 1978, China dispatched many a 
high-level government representative groups, including a group of 13 vice-premier level 
officials paying 20 visits to nearly 50 countries in Eastern Europe, Japan, Hong Kong, and 
Western Europe. The visits greatly broadened the vision of the Chinese people. Among the 
visits, the delegation to Western Europe led by Vice-Premier Gu Mu from May 2nd to June 
6th had the greatest impact. The report by this delegation pointed out that a more flexible 
payment method is required to attract foreign technology and equipment on a great scale. 
Local governments and ministries should be given greater authority in the area of foreign 
trade. China needs to implement an industrial revolution guided by latest science and 
technology through enhancing international communication about technology, such as 
sending as many exchange students to study abroad as possible. This report received the 
support from many retired senior leaders such as Ye Jianying and Nie Rongzhen as well as 
Deng Xiaoping. When talking about the historical status of these delegations, Ezra Feivel 
Vogel (2011) regarded them equally as that of the Iwakura Mission in 1871 during Japan’s 
Meiji Restoration. The most significant effect of these intensive delegations was to let the 
decision-making body of China see the discrepancy between China’s development and the 
outside world, the huge potential in learning from the West, and the urgency to accelerate 
China’s opening-up. At the Meeting of the State Council on Theoretical Matters in 1978, the 
Chinese government announced that China could no longer maintain its isolated economy 
but must utilise the favourable conditions to attract foreign technology, equipment, capital, 
and management experiences to accelerate the development of China and push the 
economy into a new era of opening-up. Shortly after the Third Plenary Session of the 11th 
CPC Central Committee, the State Council approved the establishment of the Shekou 
Industrial Zone in January 1979. In July of the same year, the Central Committee of CPC and 
the State Council jointly approved setting up ‘Special Economic Zones (SEZs)’. In August 
1980, the National People’s Congress passed the Regulations of Guangdong Special 
Economic Zones. China’s access to the international market was opened rapidly.  
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Through opening up, setting up SEZs, stimulating international trade, and actively attracting 
foreign capital, the domestic market and the global market got connected promptly. These 
kinds of production activities which aimed at the global market created many employment 
opportunities in the urban areas, and this absorbed more labour forces liberated from the 
rural areas, which resulted in huge population influx into cities. Furthermore, the huge 
amount of exports brought about more foreign reserves and could provide sufficient funding 
for importing more advanced technology from abroad. In terms of goods categories, China 
was exporting low-end consumer goods, raw materials, and primary processed products and 
importing productive materials that contained more advanced technology. During this 
process, imports had a very significant impact on productivity and technological 
advancement. Lawrence (1999) discovered similar circumstances while studying the 
experience of Japan, Korea, and the US.  
 
To sum up, China's opening-up process had five aspects of effects on the economy: 
accelerating the absorption and distribution of technology, maintaining the general balance of 
trade, learning the experience and knowledge of the global market, promoting the population 
aggregation, and facilitating the growth of the domestic market. Besides, through 
participating in the international production, both the entrepreneurs and the workers of China 
achieved significant improvement under the mechanism of ‘learning by doing’. 
 
4.2.4 From segmented markets to a unified market: the access to the domestic market 
was opened 
In the central-planned economy, all economic activities follow the nation’s central plan, like 
moves in a chess game. However, due to incomplete information, the government’s 
intervention to the economy seems too much and too rigid and the central planning suffered 
from the significant problem of low efficiency. Thus, even though China had been 
continuously exploring the practices of centralisation and decentralisation of power, the 
economy was still faced with the dilemma that ‘centralisation causes inflexibility, but chaos 
follow decentralisation’19. After the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese government realised the 
disadvantages of the highly-centralised planning and launched another round of 
decentralisation-oriented reforms along two dimensions – one is the administrative 
decentralisation, giving the power of making administrative decisions to local governments, 
and the other is the economic decentralisation, giving the power of making economic 
decisions to the production units or the enterprises (Schurmann 1966; Wu 1991). The 
decentralisation-oriented reforms effectively mobilised the enthusiasm of the local 
governments and enterprises and liberated great vitality.  
 
However, local protectionism began to emerge during the process of decentralisation for 
several reasons. One was that many provinces had relatively independent and self-
supporting industrial foundation that was established during the Third Front Movement20 
                                               
19  A traditional Chinese saying means that there is always some problem whichever way you choose.  
20  The Third Front Movement (Chinese: 三线建设) was a massive industrial development by China in its interior starting in 
1964. It involved large-scale investment in national defence, technology, basic industries (including manufacturing, mining, 
metal, and electricity), transportation, and other infrastructure investments. 
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during the 1960s and 1970s. Another is that the ‘fiscal contracting system’ adopted during 
the reforms and the economic decentralisation to the SOEs gave the local governments and 
the SOEs more incentives to earn more revenues and profits. There used to be severe 
regional mutual blockade and market segmentation in the mid-1980s – the local 
governments took a number of measures to protect local enterprises and economic activities, 
for instance, through charging additional permission fees and taxes to external enterprises. 
This gave rise to the so-called ‘duke economy’, which significantly obstructed the formation 
of a nationwide integrated market. 
 
To solve the problem of market fragmentation, the central government adopted a series of 
reforms and made various strategic compromises so that the enthusiasm of local 
governments could be maintained. The most representative actions include building a 
nationwide infrastructure network, establishing a fiscal framework based on the tax-sharing 
system,21 and adopting the economic-development-oriented promotion appraisals for local 
government officials. There is a Chinese saying that ‘if you want to be rich, you must build 
roads first’. In 1980s, China proposed the strategy to develop expressways and adopted 
many financing innovations such as franchising operation and build-operate-transfer (BOT). 
In 1988, the expressway from Shanghai to Jiading, the first in the mainland of China, was 
built and opened to traffic; in 1992, the national expressway plan of ‘five longitudinal and 
seven horizontal’ was set up and implemented in China; and by the end of 2016, the total 
length of expressway in China had exceeded 130,000 kilometres.  
 
Other infrastructures such as railways, communication, and energy also witness similar 
development. Many studies have found that the infrastructure and network can lower down 
the production cost and transportation cost significantly and can contribute to the growth of 
local economy positively (Zheng, Zhou and He 2014; Zhang 2012). The introduction of the 
tax-sharing system maintained part of the vested interest of the local governments through 
tax rebates (for every 1 CNY growth in VAT and consumption tax, the central government 
returns 30 per cent of the incremental amount to the local governments), and the clarification 
about the rule for tax transfer won the support of the relatively poorer provinces. Thus, the 
central and local governments achieved common interests through sharing the main types of 
taxes (VAT and the later enterprise income tax). This reform not only strengthened the 
central government’s capabilities of tax centralisation and balancing regional financial 
resources, but also approximately clarified the respective financial and administrative 
responsibilities of the central and local governments. Besides, it also helped to build the 
foundation for clearing extra-budgetary revenues and standardising various administrative 
fees that functioned as barriers to entry. In some sense, the fiscal reforms also helped to 
strengthen the competition among different regions. In the promotion tournament of local 
officials, economic growth became a major criterion of evaluation for the central government 
(Zhang 2000). Government officials competed against each other in attracting investments 
and developing the local economy through improving infrastructure, connecting to the 
national infrastructure network, and improving living and commercial environment. Moreover, 
                                               
21  In 1994, China introduced the tax-sharing system, which categorised China's tax revenues into central taxes and local 
taxes. Thus, the tax revenues are shared between the central and local governments. 
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through mutual learning across regions and the transfers or promotion of officials, the 
successful experience would be disseminated to other regions.  
 
The construction of national infrastructure network, the fiscal reforms, the spillover effects of 
local competition, and the authority of the central government were crucial for China in 
breaking the market fragmentation, establishing an integrated market, increasing the 
opportunities to participate in economic activities for various regions, and opening economic 
access to the domestic market. Of course, integrating China’s market is a gradual process. 
There is no doubt that protectionism still exists, and that fragmentation in the labour and 
financial markets are still quite visible. There is still huge room and potential for integrating 
the market. 
 
To sum up, one can see that China’s process of rapid economic development is essentially a 
process of continuous economic access-opening. As a matter of fact, economic access 
opening exhibits a kind of snowball effect, where a little bit of access-opening would benefit 
some people significantly, and thus they would demand for wider opening to benefit more 
people. In this way, the economic access would be opened further and further. Moreover, the 
rule of law was also encouraged and cultivated during this process. Development might bring 
about more developmental issues, and these issues in turn would push forward the reforms 
under cohesive governance. This would accompany the entire transition from poverty to 
prosperity. 
 
4.3 Interaction of unbiased single-peaked governance and access-opening 
During the process of China’s reform and opening-up, while implementing various 
development strategies at different stages, the central government always emphasised that 
the relationship among stability, reforms, and development must be dealt with carefully and 
their balance must be maintained. This looks like a political slogan, but it actually reflects the 
interactive relationship between political governance and economic system.  
 
The emphasis on stability refers to the maintenance of social order, avoidance of social 
turmoil, trying to reach consensus, and advancing collective actions. The emphasis on 
reforms means the reduction and elimination of the barrier to social development, opening 
internal and external economic access, bringing opportunities to more people, improving 
efficiency, and advancing productivity. The essence of reforms is to solve problems. The 
emphasis on development means enlarging the increments, expanding the scale of the 
economy, lowering down the average cost, and encouraging the dissemination of technology 
and knowledge to have more people benefit from development. Development is also a 
process of discovering new problems.  
 
The Chinese government has repeatedly stated that ‘development is the top priority, reforms 
are the fundamental path (to a stronger country), and stability is the foundation and 
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premise.22’ Reaping the benefits of development and having more people benefit from 
development are necessary for getting more support to push for the formation of consensus 
on new policies and reforms and strengthening the single-peaked governance of the CPC. 
This is not only a mechanism to achieve the performance legitimacy, but also an important 
channel for reaching social compromises and consensus. Reform, as the fundamental path 
to a stronger country, focuses on responding to new issues and new expectations during 
development, breaking through the system obstructions, creating more opportunities, and 
promoting more efficient competition to achieve greater development. The wider the 
economic access is, the greater the potential for economic development. Stability, as the 
foundation and premise, focuses on the fact that without a stable environment and social 
order, there will be no effective social consensus, reforms cannot be advanced, and 
development will not take place. Meanwhile, the gains of reforms and development can 
benefit most people and further improve social stability. During the process of development, 
the efforts to achieve the interaction and balance of the three factors make the Chinese 
miracle that ‘it always makes things happen’. 
 
Figure 4.1 China’s TFP growth rate: 1976–2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors' own 
 
As shown in Figure 4.1, throughout the past four decades of rapid development in China, 
besides the fast growth of GDP per capita, the total factor productivity (TFP) also displayed 
the features of technological catch-up: after breaking away from the low growth model since 
1977, it maintained over 2 per cent growth rate in multiple years. Under the premise of 
social stability and order, the formation of an unbiased single-peaked governance structure 
propelled effective implementation of policies and gradually increased economic access. 
Through absorbing foreign technology and large-scaled domestic production, the diffusion 
of technology was accelerated, and thus, the TFP has kept growing at a high rate. It should 
be noted that China’s TFP growth rate declined slightly after the financial crisis in 2008. 
 
In the interaction between China’s political governance and economic system, special 
attention should be paid to the following several Chinese characteristics.  
                                               
22  This statement is always seen in many government reports, while most of them are report of meeting or speech rather 
than academic paper. It can be found in the education material such as Theory of Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics (2010), chapter 6. Beijing, Central Document Press. 
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Firstly, there is a mutually promoting relationship between the government and the 
market. Since all reforms started from the planned economy, the government’s role in the 
marketisation reforms is more than just decentralising its authority, but instead, the 
government played a significant role in establishing the market and promoting the 
development of the market. The government and the market mutually promoted each other, 
instead of complementing each other in a way that the government does what the market is 
incapable of and the market does what the government is incapable of. Moreover, the 
borders between the government and the market saw efficient dynamic adjustment. While 
the government decided to stop intervening the market directly, its functions in regulating 
the market are also being expanded and adjusted accordingly.  
 
Secondly, the dual-track system played an important role during the reforms. There 
are three main manifestations of the dual-track system. One is the incremental reform, 
under which new institutions or organisations, such as individual economies and township 
and village enterprises, can emerge and grow. With the accumulation of incremental 
reforms, the institution structure gradually changed. Another manifestation is the special 
economic zone (SEZs) and the industrial zone, in which economic participants can enjoy 
different policies. A third manifestation is the reform piloting zone, which is used to test the 
reforms in a small area. Only successful reforms were promoted while the failed ones were 
discarded. The benefits of this approach include minimising the resistance to reforms 
(including both interest-related and ideological), limiting the risks to a small scale, and 
making use of the partial result and effects to gain support for the reform. Incremental 
reforms and piloting zones, in which benefits of reforms are obvious, are both quite practical 
strategies under the single-peaked governance to achieve consensus and form collective 
actions – as people, including the objectors, gained actual benefits, social consensus on 
advancing further market reforms could be achieved more easily.  
 
Thirdly, the Party and the government’s ability to penetrate to the grass-roots level 
and to mobilise people is also critical. The Communist government can penetrate 
villages or village groups, neighbourhood committees, and various enterprises and 
organisations. Thus, it has tremendous mobilisation capability. Every order from the central 
government can reach every corner of the country in a very short period and be executed 
through the bureaucratic system. This completely changed the historical situation that 
‘imperial power would never be extended to the rural area’23 for the limitation of ruling 
capability and local financial resource. Compared with any of the dynasties in Chinese 
history, this is one of the most significant features of the People’s Republic of China. 
Furthermore, the government makes use of land, taxes, and the state-owned financial 
system to actively convert its saving mobilisation capability into investment.  
 
Fourthly, the role of a strong central government and competing local governments 
cannot be neglected. The tournament mechanism among the local government officials 
                                               
23  Wen Tiejun (1993) proposes the term that ‘imperial power would never be extended to the rural area’ when summarising 
the governance structure of China in the history. Similar idea could be found in Fei Xiaotong (1947a; 1947b), and recent 
discussion could be found in Hu Heng (2015). 
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under the authority of the central government achieved the compatibility between market 
integration and regional competition. During the competition, the local governments 
increased the improvements in infrastructure and business environments, strengthened the 
connectivity between the local area and the national transportation network, and enhanced 
the fast dissemination and spillover of local management experience to attract funding and 
projects, and this accelerated the process of market integration in turn. 
 
 
5  The model 
This section will sketch a theoretical model in two steps. First, we develop a political 
economic model under the analytic framework proposed above; we prove that (a) faced with 
the emergence of potential competing group, and (b) assuming patience and the pursuit of 
long-term governance, the optimal choice under a single-peaked political arrangement is 
unbiased governance, while under multi-peaked governance, the optimal choice favours 
compromise, consensus, and common actions. Second, we introduce this political model into 
a three-sector overlapping-generation (OLG) model, and show that continuous economic 
growth relies on the combination of access-opening institutions and political cohesion, which 
could result from either unbiased single-peaked or compromise-oriented multi-peaked 
governance. Following the model presentation, we will propose three conjectures in a 
summary section. 
 
5.1 A political economic and governance model 
Based on the building blocks proposed above, we would start with a simple political 
economic model to investigate the optimal choice under different types of political 
governance. We should clarify at the outset that we have no intention here of determining 
how a state comes to develop single-peaked or multi-peaked political governance, but will 
focus only on the optimal choices of a patient interest group or party pursuing long-term 
governance. 
 
5.1.1 Optimal choice under single-peaked political governance 
Consider a society with its original state of governance single-peaked. For the sake of 
illustration, let’s use a unit circle to represent the total population of the society as Figure 5.1 
shows. If the political position of an interest group or party is at the centre of the circle, we 
say that the political governance of the society is unbiased; otherwise, it is biased, and the 
distance between the political position of the interest group or party and the centre of the 
circle, denoted by d, refers to the degree of bias. 
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Figure 5.1 Illustration of political governance bias 
 
Source: Authors' own 
 
Without loss of generality, we assume that  
 
1. The original single-interest group or party needs to choose a degree of governance 
bias d at t=0, and once decided, d will not change over time. 
2. When the governance is biased, i.e. 𝑑 ≠ 0, another competing interest group or party 
is likely to emerge, with a probability of P(d, t), which is an increasing function of both d 
and the bias duration t. 
3. Once a competing interest group emerges, the state governance would not be able to 
revert to the single-peaked type. 
4. When the governance is biased without a competing interest group, the payoff for the 
original single-interest group is greater than with unbiased governance; that is, 
𝑈𝑁(𝑑 > 0) > 𝑈𝑁(𝑑 = 0). 
5. All groups pursue long-term governance.  
 
Furthermore, we will not discuss the evolution of political governance when a competing 
interest group emerges, but simply assume that the payoff for the original single-interest 
group will be lower than under unbiased governance; that is, 𝑈𝑁(𝑑 = 0) > 𝑈𝑌. Figure 5.2 
describes an evolution of single-peaked political governance; we will reserve discussion 
about the optimal choice under multi-peaked governance for the next subsection. 
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Figure 5.2 Evolution of single-peaked political governance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors' own 
 
Thus, we have the lifelong expected payoff for the original single-interest group or party at 
t=0 as follows: 
𝐸𝑈0 = (1 − 𝑃(𝑑, 1))(𝑈𝑁 + 𝛽𝐸𝑈1) + 𝑃(𝑑, 1)(𝑈𝑌 + 𝛽𝑈𝑌 + 𝛽
2𝑈𝑌 + ⋯ ) 
      = (1 − 𝑃(𝑑, 1))(𝑈𝑁 + 𝛽𝐸𝑈1) + 𝑃(𝑑, 1)
𝑈𝑌
1 − 𝛽
 
Moreover, the expected payoff at t follows a similar recursive structure; that is,  
𝐸𝑈𝑡 = (1 − 𝑃(𝑑, 𝑡 + 1))(𝑈𝑁 + 𝛽𝐸𝑈𝑡+1) + 𝑃(𝑑, 𝑡 + 1)
𝑈𝑌
1 − 𝛽
 
For simplicity, let’s assume 𝑷(𝒅, 𝒕 + 𝟏) = 𝑷(𝒅, 𝒕) = 𝒅, and we have  
𝐸𝑈0 = (1 − 𝑑)(𝑈𝑁 + 𝛽𝐸𝑈1) + 𝑑
𝑈𝑌
1 − 𝛽
 
                  = (1 − 𝑑) {𝑈𝑁 + 𝛽 [(1 − 𝑑)(𝑈𝑁 + 𝛽𝐸𝑈2) + 𝑑
𝑈𝑌
1 − 𝛽
]} + 𝑑
𝑈𝑌
1 − 𝛽
 
                  = (1 − 𝑑)𝑈𝑁[1 + 𝛽(1 − 𝑑)] + (1 − 𝑑)
2𝛽2𝐸𝑈2 + [𝛽(1 − 𝑑) + 1]𝑑
𝑈𝑌
1 − 𝛽
 
                  = (1 − 𝑑)𝑈𝑁[1 + 𝛽(1 − 𝑑)] + (1 − 𝑑)
2𝛽2 {(1 − 𝑑)(𝑈𝑁 + 𝛽𝐸𝑈3) + 𝑑
𝑈𝑌
1 − 𝛽
}
+ [𝛽(1 − 𝑑) + 1]𝑑
𝑈𝑌
1 − 𝛽
 
                  = (1 − 𝑑)𝑈𝑁[1 + 𝛽(1 − 𝑑) + (1 − 𝑑)
2𝛽2] + (1 − 𝑑)3𝛽3𝐸𝑈3
+ [(1 − 𝑑)2𝛽2 + 𝛽(1 − 𝑑) + 1]𝑑
𝑈𝑌
1 − 𝛽
 
                  = (1 − 𝑑)𝑈𝑁[1 + 𝛽(1 − 𝑑) + (1 − 𝑑)
2𝛽2 + ⋯ + (1 − 𝑑)𝑡𝛽𝑡] + (1 − 𝑑)𝑡+1𝛽𝑡+1𝐸𝑈𝑡+1
+ [(1 − 𝑑)𝑡𝛽𝑡 + ⋯ + (1 − 𝑑)2𝛽2 + 𝛽(1 − 𝑑) + 1]𝑑
𝑈𝑌
1 − 𝛽
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Taking the limit when t approaches the infinite future, we have  
lim
𝑛→∞
(1 − 𝑑)𝑡+1𝛽𝑡+1𝐸𝑈𝑡+1 = 0 
and  
𝐸𝑈0 = (1 − 𝑑)𝑈𝑁
1
1 − 𝛽(1 − 𝑑)
+
𝑑𝑈𝑌
1 − 𝛽
1
1 − 𝛽(1 − 𝑑)
 
That is,  
𝐸𝑈0 =
1
1 − 𝛽(1 − 𝑑)
((1 − 𝑑)𝑈𝑁 +
𝑑𝑈𝑌
1 − 𝛽
) 
As one might note, the lifelong expected payoff for the original single-interest group or party 
at t=0 is a function of the degree of political governance bias, 𝑑. And thus to maximise the 
expected payoff, the interest group needs to choose an optimal degree of political 
governance bias.  
As a trial investigation, we can assume that both 𝑼𝒀 and 𝑼𝑵 are independent of 𝒅, 
and then, taking the partial derivative of 𝐸𝑈0 with respect to 𝑑 will give us 
  
𝜕𝐸𝑈0
𝜕𝑑
=
𝑈𝑌 − 𝑈𝑁
(1 − 𝛽 + 𝛽𝑑)2
 
Obviously, as long as 𝑈𝑁 > 𝑈𝑌, as assumed at the very beginning, we always have 
𝜕𝐸𝑈0
𝜕𝑑
< 0. 
Hence, the optimal degree of governance bias is  
 
𝑑∗ = 0 
 
In other words, under a single-peaked arrangement, when 𝑈𝑁 and 𝑈𝑌 are independent of 𝑑, 
the optimal choice of an interest group or party pursuing long-term governance is unbiased 
governance.  
But we do not need to assume independent 𝑈𝑁 and 𝑈𝑌 for the model to function. A more 
realistic assumption is that 
𝜕𝑈𝑌(𝑑)
𝜕𝑑
< 0 and 
𝜕𝑈𝑁(𝑑)
𝜕𝑑
> 0. That is, when a competing interest 
group emerges as the result of the original governance bias, the expected payoff for the 
original group would decrease in accordance with the degree of bias; however, in the 
absence of a competing group, the expected payoff would increase. Following this 
assumption, we have  
 
𝜕𝐸𝑈0
𝜕𝑑
=
(1 − 𝑑)𝑈𝑁
′(𝑑)
1 − 𝛽 + 𝛽𝑑
+
𝑑𝑈𝑌
′(𝑑)
(1 − 𝛽)(1 − 𝛽 + 𝛽𝑑)
+
𝑈𝑌(𝑑) − 𝑈𝑁(𝑑)
(1 − 𝛽 + 𝛽𝑑)2
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Numerically, let’s assume  
𝑈𝑌(𝑑) = 1 − 𝑑 
and 
𝑈𝑁(𝑑) =
1
1 − 𝑑
 
Hence  
𝑈𝑌
′(𝑑) = −1 
𝑈𝑁
′(𝑑) =  
1
(1 − 𝑑)2
 
Plugging these expressions into 
𝜕𝐸𝑈0
𝜕𝑑
 yields  
𝜕𝐸𝑈0
𝜕𝑑
=
(1 − 𝑑) 
1
(1−𝑑)2
1 − 𝛽 + 𝛽𝑑
−
𝑑
(1 − 𝛽)(1 − 𝛽 + 𝛽𝑑)
+
1 − 𝑑 −
1
1−𝑑
(1 − 𝛽 + 𝛽𝑑)2
 
That is,  
𝜕𝐸𝑈0
𝜕𝑑
=
(1 − 𝛽)2 − 2𝑑(1 − 𝛽) − 𝛽𝑑2
(1 − 𝛽)(1 − 𝛽 + 𝛽𝑑)2
 
Setting 
𝜕𝐸𝑈0
𝜕𝑑
= 0 will give us the optimal degree of governance bias; that is,  
𝑑∗ =
1 − 𝛽
√1 + 𝛽 + 1
 
 
According to this expression, we find the following:  
1. When 𝑼𝑵 increases and 𝑼𝒀 decreases in accordance with the degree of governance 
bias, an interest group of party pursuing long-term governance will choose a non-zero 
degree of governance bias, but the optimal bias remains quite small (for instance, 
when 𝛽=0.96, 𝑑∗ =1.67%); 
2. 𝑑∗ is a decreasing function of 𝛽 — the smaller the value of  𝛽 (that is, the less 
patient the interest group), the greater the optimal governance bias;  
3. Even if it possesses no patience (𝛽 = 0), an interest group or party that pursues long-
term governance would not choose 100 per cent governance bias, but an optimal one, 
𝑑∗ =0.5. 
 
5.1.2 Optimal choice under multi-peaked political governance 
In this section, let’s turn to multi-peaked political governance, with a focus on the double-
peaked case. 
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Consider a game with two players (interest groups or parties), A and B. In this game, each of 
the two players has two options – ‘Confrontation’ and ‘Compromise’, and both have complete 
information. The payoff matrix appears in Table 5.1 as follows, where numerical values are 
assumed to satisfy 𝑐 > 𝑑 > 𝑎 > 𝑏.  
 
Table 5.1 Payoff matrix of the game 
 
 
Interest Group B 
 Interest Group A 
 Confrontation Compromise 
Confrontation a, a c, b 
Compromise b, c d, d 
Source: Authors' own 
 
As one might observe, this game has a unique, dominant-strategy Nash equilibrium, which is 
(Confrontation, Confrontation). Furthermore, one can also see that this game presents a 
typical ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’ – the equilibrium payoff for each interest group is strictly lower 
than the payoff if both choose ‘Compromise’; that is, (𝑎, 𝑎) ≪ (𝑑, 𝑑). However, it seems 
almost impossible for them to compromise with one another in this one-shot game. 
  
Fortunately, if both interest groups pursue long-term governance, and especially when they 
exercise enough patience, more encouraging results emerge, with the payoff (𝑑, 𝑑) 
achievable under some appropriate mechanism. 
 
Now, let’s take the Prisoner's Dilemma game above as a stage game, which will be repeated 
an infinite number of times. According to Friedman's (1971) Folk Theorem, one finds that if 
the player has enough patience and farsightedness (i.e. if the discounting factor 𝛽 is high 
enough), then the preferred strategy will not be a Nash variant of the stage game, but 
cooperation and a socially optimal strategy. The question naturally arises of how to ensure 
that this happens. 
 
For the sake of illustration, let’s think about the following mechanism. The two players start 
by choosing ‘Compromise’ at the beginning of the repeated game, and the payoff of each 
player in the stage game is 𝑑. However, if 𝑐 > 𝑑 > 𝑎 > 𝑏 as assumed above, each player 
always has the incentive to deviate from ‘Compromise’ to ‘Confrontation’ and obtain a higher 
payoff, 𝑐. For instance, say that Interest Group A explores the feasibility of a one-shot 
deviation from the repeated cooperative strategy, as shown below in Figure 5.3: 
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Figure 5.3 One-shot deviation from the repeated cooperative strategy 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors' own 
As a matter of fact, when Interest Group A chooses to deviate, the counter-player (Interest 
Group B) may realise that this will damage his/her own payoff (𝑏 < 𝑑). If this kind of deviation 
can happen once, then the Interest Group A will deviate again and again, eventually 
destroying the cooperation. So to prevent this, Interest Group B may punish the counter-
player who deviates by abandoning the cooperative strategy and choosing ‘Confrontation’, as 
illustrated below in Figure 5.4. This strategy with such a punishment mechanism is referred 
to a trigger strategy. 
 
Figure 5.4 One-shot deviation from the repeated cooperative strategy 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors' own 
With this punishment mechanism introduced, Interest Group A will not deviate as long as the 
present value of the lifelong payoff of deviation + punishment remains lower than that of 
simply following the cooperative strategy. That is,  
 
𝑐 + 𝛽𝑎 + 𝛽2𝑎 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑡𝑎 + ⋯ < 𝑑 + 𝛽𝑑 + 𝛽2𝑑 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑡𝑑 + ⋯ 
 
Or equivalently 
𝛽 >
𝑐 − 𝑑
𝑐 − 𝑎
 
 
In other words, as long as both interest groups or parties pursue long-term governance (i.e. 
take a far-sighted view) and have enough patience (i.e. the discounting factor 𝛽 is higher 
than the threshold), an effective trigger strategy can ensure that both players cooperate and 
play a socially optimum strategy, such as (Compromise, Compromise). However, if one or 
t=0 t=1 t=2 … t=n t=n+1 t=n+2 
Compromise 
Compromise 
Compromise 
Compromise 
Compromise 
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Confrontatio
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Compromise 
Compromise 
Compromise 
Compromise 
(d, d) (d, d) (d, d) (c, b) (d, d) (d, d) 
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Compromise 
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n 
Confrontatio
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both are too impatient (i.e. the discounting factor 𝛽 is too small), the trigger strategy may not 
work.  
As one can see, punishing players who deviate from this cooperative strategy forms an 
essential part of strategies in the infinitely repeated game. The punishment may take the 
form of a strategy leading to reduced payoff for both players for the rest of the game. A 
player may tend to act selfishly and increase his/her own reward, rather than playing the 
socially optimum strategy. However, with the knowledge that the other player is following a 
trigger strategy, he or she would expect deviation at this stage to create to receive reduced 
payoffs in the future. An effective trigger strategy ensures that cooperation has more utility to 
the player than acting selfishly now and facing the other player’s punishment in the future. 
 
To sum up, drawing on the concept of a trigger strategy in an infinitely repeated game, we 
have shown that compromise could become the optimal choice of interest groups or parties 
under multi-peaked political governance, as long as these groups pursue long-term 
governance and possess enough patience. 
 
5.2 A three-sector overlapping-generation (OLG) model 
We will now introduce the political model above into a three-sector overlapping-generation 
(OLG) model under the framework of endogenous growth theory, and then use simulations to 
investigate the effects of political governance and economic institutions on growth. The three 
sectors are production, consumption, and government. For political governance, we chiefly 
focus on the representativeness of political interest groups – whether they represent all or 
just a part of the population. Concerning economic institutions, we focus on accessibility, with 
external accessibility captured by the scale of international trade and internal accessibility 
captured by differences in commodity prices and wage rates. 
 
5.2.1 The consumption sector and external accessibility of the economy 
Consider an economy with two types of workers/consumers. Type 1 can only produce 
intermediate goods and Type 2, only consumption goods. Both types of workers live on 
consumption goods, either produced domestically or imported from abroad. Moreover, let’s 
assume that each consumer has a life of T (say, T=55) periods (years), working for the first J 
(J=40) periods and then retiring.24 𝑷𝑡,𝑖 denotes the total population of Type 
𝑖 workers/consumers born in period 𝑡, with a constant growth rate 𝒈𝑃 for both types. 
 
A representative consumer’s lifelong utility could be given as  
𝑢𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑗−1
55
𝑗=1
[(𝑐𝑡,𝑗,𝑖
𝑖𝑛 )
𝜑
+ (𝑐𝑡,𝑗,𝑖
𝑜𝑢𝑡)
𝜑
− 𝑎𝑙𝑡,𝑗,𝑖
𝑏 ]               𝑖 = 1, 2 
where, for a Type 𝑖 consumer born in period 𝑡 (𝑖 = 1, 2):  
• 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 denotes the consumer utility; 
                                               
24  In this sense, the life of a worker from period 1 to period 55 in the model corresponds to life from 21 to 75 years old in 
real life, with [21, 60] as the working age and [61, 75] as the period of retirement. 
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• 𝑐𝑡,𝑗,𝑖
𝑖𝑛  and 𝑐𝑡,𝑗,𝑖
𝑜𝑢𝑡 respectively denote the amount of domestic and foreign consumption 
goods (differing in kind) consumed by this consumer at the age of 𝑗; 
• 𝑙𝑡,𝑗,𝑖 denotes the labour amount provided by this consumer at the age of j; 
• 𝛽𝑖 denotes the discounting factor of Type 𝑖 consumer;  
• 𝑎 is a coefficient for the disutility of working; and  
• 𝜑 and 𝑏 are constant coefficients. 
 
The consumer faces the lifelong budget constraint that the total present value of lifelong 
consumption cannot exceed the present value of lifelong income; that is, 
 
∑{[∏(1 + 𝑟𝑡+𝑧,𝑖)
−1
𝑗−1
𝑧
](𝑝𝑡+𝑗−1,2𝑐𝑡,𝑗,𝑖
𝑖𝑛 + 𝑝𝑡+𝑗−1,3𝑐𝑡,𝑗,𝑖
𝑜𝑢𝑡)}
55
𝑗=1
≤ ∑{[∏(1 + 𝑟𝑡+𝑧,𝑖)
−1
𝑗−1
𝑧
]𝑤𝑡+𝑗−1,𝑖𝑙𝑡,𝑗,𝑖}
40
𝑗=1
 
 
where 𝑝𝑡+𝑗−1,2 and 𝑝𝑡+𝑗−1,3respectively denote the price of domestic and foreign 
consumption goods. If 𝑒𝑡,𝑗,𝑖 denotes the total asset (saving) held by Type 𝑖 consumer born 
in period 𝑡 at age 𝑗, then we have the rule for asset accumulation as follows: 
 
𝑒𝑡,𝑗,𝑖 = {
𝑒𝑡,𝑗−1,𝑖(1 + 𝑟𝑡+𝑗−1,𝑖) + 𝑤𝑡+𝑗−1,𝑖𝑙𝑡,𝑗,𝑖 − 𝑝𝑡+𝑗−1,2𝑐𝑡,𝑗,𝑖
𝑖𝑛 − 𝑝𝑡+𝑗−1,3𝑐𝑡,𝑗,𝑖
𝑜𝑢𝑡         𝑗 = 1, … ,40;
𝑒𝑡,𝑗−1,𝑖(1 + 𝑟𝑡+𝑗−1,𝑖) − 𝑝𝑡+𝑗−1,2𝑐𝑡,𝑗,𝑖
𝑖𝑛 − 𝑝𝑡+𝑗−1,3𝑐𝑡,𝑗,𝑖
𝑜𝑢𝑡                                    𝑗 = 1, … ,55.
 
 
where 𝑞𝑡,𝑗,𝑖 is the amount of intermediate goods imported by this consumer at the age of 𝑗, 
and 𝑝𝑡+𝑗−1,1
𝑜  is its price. If 𝑘𝑡,𝑗,𝑖 denotes the consumer’s capital stock 𝑖 𝑡 at age 𝑗, then we 
have 
 
𝑘𝑡,𝑗,𝑖 = 𝑘𝑡,𝑗−1,𝑖 + 𝑞𝑡,𝑗,𝑖 + (𝑒𝑡,𝑗,𝑖 − 𝑒𝑡,𝑗−1,𝑖 − 𝑝𝑡+𝑗−1,1
𝑜 𝑞𝑡,𝑗,𝑖)/𝑝𝑡+𝑗−1,1         𝑗 = 1, … ,55. 
 
where 𝑞𝑡,𝑗,1 = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑞𝑡,𝑗,2 ≥ 0. 
5.2.2 The production sector and internal accessibility of the economy 
There are two types of firms in the economy: one specialising in the production of 
intermediate goods, and the other specialising in consumption goods. Assume that the 
intermediate goods market is monopolistic (𝑵𝟏 = 1) while the consumption goods market is 
perfectly competitive ( ). Moreover, capital can flow freely across the two types of 
firms, but a natural barrier exists for labour mobility – as assumed above, each type of 
worker can only produce one type of goods. Given the monopolistic market structure for the 
intermediate goods, we would anticipate a higher wage rate paid by monopolistic than by 
competitive firms, but there might be more underemployment in the monopolistic 
intermediate goods market. When the number of Type 1 firms increases, i.e., with 
improvement in the internal accessibility of the economy, the price of intermediate goods 
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tends to approach the competitive price; the quantity of intermediate goods produced would 
increase, and the underemployment level of Type 1 workers would drop, with a reduction in 
the marginal return of labour.  
 
The objective of either a Type 1 or Type 2 firm is to maximise its profit at each period; that is,  
 
𝑀𝑎𝑥
𝐿𝑡,𝑖 ,   𝐾𝑡,𝑖
𝑝𝑡,𝑖𝐾𝑡,𝑖
𝛼𝑖(𝐴𝑡,𝑖𝐿𝑡,𝑖)
1−𝛼𝑖 − 𝑤𝑡,𝑖𝐿𝑡,𝑖 − (𝑟𝑡,𝑖 + 𝛿𝑖)𝐾𝑡,𝑖     ,   𝑖 = 1, 2 
 
where the following values apply to Type i firms at period t:  
 
• 𝑝𝑡,𝑖 denotes the goods price; 
• 𝐾𝑡,𝑖 denotes the capital stock;  
• 𝐿𝑡,𝑖 denotes the labour investment; 
• 𝑤𝑡,𝑖 denotes the wage rate paid; 
• 𝑟𝑡,𝑖 denotes the interest rate; 
•  denotes the depreciation rate of capital; and 
• 𝐴𝑡,𝑖 denotes the technology.  
 
Moreover, we assume 𝐴𝑡,𝑖 = 𝐵𝑡,𝑖𝐾𝑡,𝑖
𝜃𝑖, which obviously belongs to the family of capital-driven 
‘learning-by-doing’ models. Technological improvement might arise from various factors, 
including improvement in external accessibility, economy of scale, and accumulated working 
experience. 
 
In period t, the total labour investment by Type 𝑖 firm is 𝐿𝑡,𝑖 = ∑ 𝑙𝑡−𝑗+1,𝑗,𝑖𝑷𝑡−𝑗+1,𝑗,𝑖
40
𝑗=1 , where, 
for a Type 𝑖 consumer born in period 𝑡 − 𝑗 + 1, 
  
• 𝑙𝑡−𝑗+1,𝑗,𝑖 denotes the labour amount provided, and  
• 𝑷𝑡−𝑗+1,𝑗,𝑖 denotes the total population of this consumer type. 
 
In addition, Type 2 firms in this economy might be allowed to import intermediate goods from 
abroad and export consumption goods. Moreover, the imported intermediate goods are 
assumed to be cheaper (say the price is 𝑝𝑡,2
𝑜 ) and more productive. However, the 
government might set a quota for the imports, say at 𝑄𝑡,𝑖. If the quota is not big enough, 
Type 2 firms might still have to buy intermediate goods from the domestic Type 1 firm, most 
likely at a higher price. 
 
5.2.3 The capital market and the goods market 
In the capital market, the equilibrium condition requires the total capital stock of the economy 
in some period 𝑡 to equal the sum of capital stock belonging to every consumer, which 
would be used for production in the next period 𝑡 + 1; that is, 
∑ 𝑘𝑡−𝑗,𝑗,1𝑷𝑡−𝑗,𝑗,1
55
𝑗=1
+ ∑ 𝑘𝑡−𝑗,𝑗,2𝑷𝑡−𝑗,𝑗,2
55
𝑗=1
= 𝐾𝑡,1 + 𝐾𝑡,2 
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where for a Type 𝑖 consumer born in period 𝑡 − 𝑗, 
• 𝑘𝑡−𝑗,𝑗,𝑖 denotes the total assets held in period 𝑡 − 1, and  
• 𝑷𝑡−𝑗,𝑗,𝑖 denotes the total population of these consumers. 
 
In the intermediate goods market, the equilibrium condition is that the total output of Type 1 
firm(s) plus the total imported intermediate goods will equal the total investment demand of 
both types of firms; that is, 
 
𝐾𝑡,1
𝛼1(𝐴𝑡,1𝐿𝑡,1)
1−𝛼1 + 𝑄𝑡,2 = 𝐼𝑡,1 + 𝐼𝑡,2 
 
where 𝐼𝑡,𝑖 represents the incremental investment of each type of firm. The capital 
accumulation of each type of firm also satisfies 
 
𝐾𝑡+1,𝑖 = 𝐾𝑡,𝑖 − 𝛿𝑖𝐾𝑡,𝑖 + 𝐼𝑡,𝑖 
 
In the consumption goods market, the market-clearing condition is that  
 
𝑵𝟐𝐾𝑡,1
𝛼1(𝐴𝑡,1𝐿𝑡,1)
1−𝛼1 = (𝐶𝑡,1
𝑖𝑛 + 𝐶𝑡,2
𝑖𝑛 ) +
𝑝𝑡,3(𝐶𝑡,1
𝑜𝑢𝑡 + 𝐶𝑡,2
𝑜𝑢𝑡)
𝑝𝑡,1
+
𝑝𝑡,1
𝑜 𝑄𝑡,2
𝑝𝑡,1
 
 
where 𝐶𝑡,𝑖
𝑖𝑛 and 𝐶𝑡,𝑖
𝑜𝑢𝑡 respectively denote the domestic and foreign goods consumed by 
Type i consumers. 
 
5.2.4 The political governance 
Without government intervention, the monopolistic firm producing intermediate goods would 
choose a monopolistic price that maximises its profit, for instance 𝑝1
∗ as illustrated in Figure 
5.5. Theoretically, we can also figure out the competitive price, say 𝑝1
∗∗, as illustrated in 
Figure 5.5. In general, the government can intervene in the monopolistic intermediate goods 
market by setting a ceiling price for the goods, with that price reasonably falling between 𝑝1
∗ 
and 𝑝1
∗∗. In line with the political model in the previous section, when the ceiling price is set at 
𝑝1
∗∗, we say that the political governance is unbiased, that is, d=0; when the ceiling price is 
set at 𝑝1
∗∗, we say the political governance is fully biased, that is, d=1.  
 
Figure 5.5 Monopolistic price, competitive price and political governance bias 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors' own 
𝑀𝑅 
𝑝1
∗∗ (d=0) 
𝑝1
∗ 
(d=1) 
𝑄 
𝑃 
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At the same time, the government can also balance the interests of different groups by 
adjusting 𝑄𝑡,𝑖, the quota of intermediate goods imports – when 𝑄𝑡,𝑖 = 0, it means completely 
biased governance; when 𝑄𝑡,𝑖increases, it means more competition pressure upon the 
domestic Type 1 firm, such that they would choose to cut the price of domestically produced 
intermediate goods. When 𝑄𝑡,𝑖 is large enough – say, exceeding a threshold where the price 
of domestically-produced intermediate goods is as low as the completely competitive level – 
one could consider the governance unbiased. One can also see that adjusting the quota of 
intermediate goods imported has effects equivalent to those of intervening directly in their 
price.  
 
As shown above, as long as a far-sighted interest group pursues long-term governance, it 
would not choose bias (to the intermediate firms) for too long of a period. In this set-up, the 
government will choose an optimal price for the intermediate goods by balancing the payoffs 
for both types of firms as well as their workers. In the following section, we will run a series 
simulation to investigate the growth effects of choices in degrees of governance bias.  
 
In addition, the government can also adjust the quota of foreign consumption goods, and two 
types of consumers can buy them. Since the foreign consumption goods can increase 
utilities for all people, the government will liberalise their import restrictions. For convenience, 
when we analyse the effects of governance bias, we set foreign consumption goods at a 
completely restricted level. Afterwards, we will liberalise the restrictions and simulate the 
effects on economic growth. 
 
5.2.5 Specification and values of parameters 
To conduct the simulation, numerical values need to be assigned to the parameters in the 
model above, as shown in Table 5.2. 
 
Table 5.2 Numerical values of parameters 
Source: Authors' own 
5.2.6 Political governance and economic cohesion in the model 
As assumed above, the monopolistic firm’s objective is to maximise the present value of its 
employees’ 40-year utility by setting a price for the intermediate goods. Consider the case 
when the quota of intermediate goods imports is zero, 𝑄𝑡,𝑖 = 0. When the discounting factor 
Coefficients Value Coefficients Value Coefficients Value Coefficients Value 
𝛼𝑖  (𝑖 = 1, 2) 0.4 𝐵𝑡,1 0.03 𝐶𝑇+0
𝑜𝑢𝑡  0 𝑝1
∗ 1.1 
𝛽𝑖  (𝑖 = 1,2) 0.94 𝐵𝑡,2 0.05 𝒈𝑃 0.006 𝑝1
∗∗ 1 
𝜃𝑖  (𝑖 = 1, 2) 0.5 𝑄𝑡,1 0 𝑎 2 𝑝𝑡,1
𝑜  1 
𝛿𝑖  (𝑖 = 1,2) 0.06 𝑄𝑇+0,2 0 𝑏 2 𝑝𝑡,2 1 
𝐾𝑇+0,1 187 𝑷𝑇+0,1 208 φ 0.5 𝑝𝑡,3 1 
𝐾𝑇+0,2 499 𝑷𝑇+0,2 592     
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𝛽𝑖 is 0.94 (𝑖 = 1,2), the optimal monopolistic price is 𝑝1
∗ = 1.1.25 If the monopoly is broken 
down and sufficient competition introduced, say 𝑵𝟏 → ∞, the competitive price of the 
intermediate goods is 𝑝1
∗∗ = 1. Then we can release the quota of intermediate goods imports, 
say by increasing values of 𝑄𝑡,𝑖. As a result, the demand for domestically-produced 
intermediate goods will decline as expected, and their price will also drop accordingly. This 
adjustment will not stop before the price drops to the competitive level, 1. Simulation results 
indicate that when the ratio of imported intermediate goods over the domestically-purchased 
intermediate goods is 1:10, the optimal monopolistic price is 1.108, at which level Type 1 
consumers have the same utility as under complete competition, 1502.5. Meanwhile, the 
amount of imported intermediate goods comes to roughly 4.2 units.  
 
To achieve long-term governance, the interest group will have to balance the interests of 
both types of firms as well as their workers, and choose a ceiling price for the intermediate 
goods, anticipated to fall between 𝑝1
∗ and 𝑝1
∗∗. Alternatively, as shown above, adjusting the 
quota of intermediate goods imports has equivalent effects as intervening directly in their 
price. The remainder of this section will focus on price intervention and quota adjustment to 
analyse two types of political governance. 
 
1. Double-peaked political governance 
Two interest groups represent the two types of workers/consumers, respectively. Naturally, 
each interest group tends to choose a price level preferred by their own supporters. 
However, if the one representing the monopolistic sector insists on setting the price of the 
intermediate goods at 𝑝1
∗ while the other representing the competitive sector insists on 𝑝1
∗∗, 
then we can anticipate that the groups could not reach consensus and would remain mired in 
conflict. For the sake of analysis, assume each interest group holds power for 10 years in 
turn. Simulation gives Type 1 workers a utility of 1524.4 and Type 2 workers a utility of 
4163.7.  
 
However, both interest groups, in pursuit of long-term governance, might choose to 
compromise with each other and cooperate on the price-setting for the intermediate goods. A 
trigger strategy might ensure this cooperation: once one group chooses a different price 
rather than the agreed price at some period, the other group will impose a punishment by 
choosing never to cooperate in the future. Although the equilibrium in this case is not unique, 
the price upon which both groups would agree when compromising with each other must fall 
between 𝑝1
∗∗ and 𝑝1
∗. Taking 𝑝1 = 1.06 as an example, simulation gives Type 1 workers a 
utility of 1525.9 and Type 2 workers a utility of 4165.5 – both higher than in the conflictual 
case. 
 
Similarly, in the case of quota adjustment, the following scenario ensues if the two parties do 
not compromise: the one representing the monopolistic sector insists on setting the quota of 
intermediate goods imports at 𝑄2
∗, while the other representing the competitive sector insists 
on 𝑄2
∗∗ or more, cutting the domestic price of intermediate goods to 1. In this case, we again 
anticipate no consensus and no remaining alternative but conflict between them. The 
simulation gives Type 1 workers a utility of 1520.2 and Type 2 workers a utility of 4111.3. 
Again, if both interest groups, in pursuit of long-term governance, choose to compromise with 
each other and cooperate on the quota setting for the intermediate goods imports, the 
scenario alters. When 𝑄𝑇+1,2 = 1.4 and 𝑝1 = 1.1, Type 1 consumers can have a utility of 
1521.1 and the Type 2 utility is 4114.2, both higher than the conflictual values of 1520.2 and 
4111.3. 
 
                                               
25  If the discounting factor is changed to 0.9, the optimal monopolistic price turns out to be 1.153. 
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2. Single-peaked political governance 
Suppose there is only one interest group in the economy, representing the Type 1 workers. 
But when the original interest group’s governance is biased, the possibility exists that another 
interest group could emerge. As assumed previously, the probability of this is an increasing 
function of both the degree and duration of bias. If the original interest group’s governance is 
unbiased, then there will be no chance or incentive for a new interest group to emerge, 
because it would not improve the situation of Type 2 consumers. For simplicity, let’s assume 
the probability of a new interest group’s emergence to be 
p1
' -p1
p1
* -p1
 if the existing group chooses 
a price 𝑝1
′ > 𝑝1. Moreover, once a new interest group emerges, we would be back to the 
double-peaked case as discussed above. Hence, the objective of the existing interest group 
is to maximise   
𝑀𝑎𝑥  ∑ 𝛽1
𝑡−1 [(1 −
𝑝1
′ − 𝑝1
𝑝1
∗ − 𝑝1
) 𝑈𝑡,1(𝑝1
′ ) +
𝑝1
′ − 𝑝1
𝑝1
∗ − 𝑝1
𝑈𝑡,1(𝑝1)]
40
𝑡=1
 
 
Simulation results for this case indicate that the optimal price of intermediate goods, 𝑝1
′ , is 
1.08. And when no new interest group emerges, the Type 1 consumer utility in the first 40 
years is 1527.4, which is higher than 1525.9, the utility level when the price is 𝑝1. Noting that 
𝑝1
′ > 𝑝1, the probability of a new interest group emerging is not zero; hence the maximised 
expected utility of the existing interest group should be lower than 1527.4. Thus, the optimal 
price should fall between 1.06 and 1.08. 
 
Similarly, if the interest group chooses to use the import quota for intermediate goods rather 
than intervene directly in setting their price, the simulated optimal quota will fall between 0.7 
and 1.4. 
 
If the existing interest group has more patience and farsightedness, it might choose an even 
lower price or an even higher quota. For instance, taking 𝛽 = 0.98 and 𝑇 = 200 as an 
example, we find that when the import quota is set at the level that cuts the domestic 
monopolistic price to 1 (the competitive level), the Type 1 consumer utility becomes 8331.1 – 
higher than 8169.3, the utility level in a closed economy, i.e., the where the quota is zero. Of 
course, if the price of intermediate goods is set directly at 1, the competitive level, we have 
the same utility, 8331.1. 
 
5.2.7 Numerical simulation results for economic growth 
Scenario 1: a benchmark scenario 
Suppose that initially the economy has no external accessibility, that a monopolistic power 
dominates the market, and that the political governance is biased. In this case, we assume 
that as the import quota for intermediate goods is gradually reset to become larger, the 
economy will open up. As a result, the price of intermediate goods would accordingly drop 
from 1.1 to 1. Starting with the initial economic growth rate at 1.81 per cent, as the simulation 
results indicate, we would expect the transition to take 100 periods to finish – from the initial 
balanced growth path to a new one, as shown in Figure 5.6 (a). During this period, the 
highest GDP growth rate is 2.44 per cent, the highest rate for capital growth is 2.49 per cent, 
and the highest technological growth rates for the consumption and intermediate goods are 
1.27 per cent and 1.19 per cent respectively. The dynamics of key variables appear in Table 
5.3. 
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Table 5.3 Dynamics of key variables for the benchmark scenario 
Variables 𝒕 = 𝑻 + 𝟎 𝒕 = 𝑻 + 𝟏𝟎𝟎 Note 
𝑝𝑡,2 1.1 1 The economic accessibility varies at different values. 
𝐾𝑡 686 5478 The average growth rate is 2.1%. 
𝐿𝑡 800 1455 The constant growth rate is 1%. 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 211 1643 The average growth rate is 2.1%. 
Source: Authors' own 
Scenario 2: Faster transition  
Consider another scenario, with the same assumptions for the initial status of the economy. 
The difference lies in the speed of transition – both the import quota and the price of the 
intermediate goods are adjusted more rapidly. This would predict a transition taking 70 
periods from the initial balanced growth path to the new one, as shown in Figure 5.6 (b). 
During this period, the growth rates would change as follows: highest GDP 2.64 per cent, 
highest capital 2.69 per cent, and the highest technological for consumption goods at 1.37 
per cent and 1.25 per cent for intermediate goods. 
 
Scenario 3: Importing consumption goods 
Now we consider the effect of importing consumption goods on economic growth. With the 
same assumptions for the initial status of the economy, the difference lies in gradually 
liberalising import restrictions on foreign consumption goods. In the end, all consumers will 
be able to consume whatever foreign consumption goods they need. As with scenario 2, the 
full transition is expected to take 70 periods from the initial to the new balanced growth path, 
as shown in Figure 5.6 (c). During this transition phase, growth rates will adjust as follows: 
highest GDP at 3.69 per cent, the highest capital at 3.65 per cent, and the highest 
technological for the consumption goods and intermediate goods both at 1.82 per cent. 
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Figure 5.6 Simulated growth rate in the benchmark scenario 
(a) The benchmark scenario 
 
(b) The faster transition scenario 
 
(c) The imported consumption goods scenario
 
Source: Authors' own 
 
5.3 A summary with three conjectures 
To sum up, we are ready to propose the following three conjectures as the main implications 
of the theoretical model above. 
 
 Conjecture 1: A society’s cohesion can strengthen its economic growth. 
 Conjecture 2: An economy’s accessibility can facilitate its growth. 
 Conjecture 3: Whether the political governance is single-peaked or multi-peaked is a 
neutral variable in the economic growth of a country. 
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6 The econometric evidence 
This section provides some econometric evidence for the model above, with a focus on 
testing the three main conjectures. Firstly, we give a brief introduction for key variables of 
interest, including their definition and construction, as well as a statistical summary. Then we 
turn to the specification of the econometric model and the estimation results, followed by a 
series of robustness checks.  
 
6.1 Variables and statistical description 
6.1.1 Variables about political governance and index construction 
In line with the concepts in the theoretical framework above, variables about political 
governance aim to capture the distribution structure of political power within one economy. 
Two dimensions are considered here. One is the cohesion index, which measures the 
degree of bias in political policies – whether the policy-makers can represent as many people 
as possible outside of a small interest group, and their effectiveness in implementing policies. 
The other dimension is the peak index, basically the number of political peaks – whether 
political power concentrates in one dominating group or is shared by many, or whether the 
political governance is single-peaked or multi-peaked. Thus, an economy would fall into one 
of the four categories: biased single-peaked governance, unbiased single-peaked 
governance, compromise-oriented multi-peaked governance, or conflictual multi-peaked 
governance. 
 
We construct the cohesion index from three sub-indices. The first maps government 
effectiveness, including policy quality and implementation; it aims to capture whether an 
economy’s policymakers are as representative as possible and capable of ensuring policy 
effectiveness. The second sub-index concerns social consensus around policies, including 
policy accountability and public discussion; it reflects the expectation that such public 
discussion will have an impact on the policy process. The third sub-index addresses the 
policymakers’ capacity to mobilise economic resources, as measured by the share of tax 
revenue in total GDP. All of the raw data is available in the World Bank Databank.26 We 
should clarify that we do not simply apply the raw data but take the strategy of standardising 
it into a scale of [0, 5] (see Annexe I). We then take the average of the three sub-indices and 
obtain the country’s cohesion index for each year with available data.  
 
We construct the peak index from two sub-indices. One is the score for different election 
systems of a country or an economy, as illustrated in Table 6.1, also derived from data 
available in the World Bank Databank. One reason for using this index is that a country’s 
election system may reflect its power distribution. Since the raw data is scaled from 1 to 7, 
we also take the projection of the raw index to a scale of [0, 5]. The other sub-index is the 
Herfindahl Index, measuring the concentration of political power in the congress of a country. 
Similarly, we standardise the [0, 1]-scaled Herfindahl Index into the scale of [0, 5]. The 
                                               
26  One can gain access to the World Bank Databank via http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx  
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average of the standardised election system score and the standardised Herfindahl Index 
gives us the peak index. 
 
Table 6.1 Scores of different selection systems by World Bank 
Conditions Score 
No legislature 1 
Unelected legislature 2 
There is an election system, but with only 1 candidate. 3 
There is only 1 party, but multiple candidates in the election. 4 
Multiple parties are legal but only one party wins seats. 5 
Multiple parties win with the largest party receiving more than 75% of the seats. 6 
Multiple parties win with the largest party receiving less than 75% seats. 
 
 
7 
Source: World Band Political Index Handbook（2015） 
 
6.1.2 Variables about economic accessibility and index construction 
As argued above, accessibility is highly related to the economic performance of a country or 
region, and includes both inward and outward measures of access to economic 
opportunities. To recap, free flow of production factors and consumption goods will reflect 
internal accessibility, as will market discrimination, restrictions, or barriers; the ability of 
domestic economic actors to participate in the global market reflects external accessibility. 
Therefore, we will construct the economic accessibility index in two steps, first arriving at an 
internal and external index for each country or region, and then averaging them to obtain the 
overall accessibility index.  
 
We construct the internal accessibility index from three sub-indices corresponding to 
accessibility of the capital, labour, and goods markets. We measure each of these as follows: 
capital market by the cost of business start-ups, e.g. the ratio of the cost of business start-
ups over GNI per capita; labour market by the percentage of regularly salaried workers out of 
the total employed population, and the number of passengers carried by each kilometre of 
railway in one year; goods market by the logistics performance index, scaled from 0 to 5. We 
construct the external accessibility index from sub-indices about the scale of international 
trade, the scale of foreign direct investment (FDI), and export varieties. Again, all sub-indices 
(raw data available in the World Bank Databank) are standardised, with outliers adjusted or 
removed.27 As noted, the average of the two give the overall accessibility index for each 
country and each year. Table A.1 in Annexe II shows the ranking of the top 50 
countries/regions according to the accessibility index for the year 2015. 
                                               
27 One can refer to Annexe I for details about the index construction.  
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6.1.3 Other variables and data coverage 
Besides the key variables of interest discussed above, we also collected data about GDP as 
well as its growth rate, total population as well as GDP per capita, total area of each 
country/region, and other variables. Given the missing data for many countries in earlier 
years, the panel data of 209 countries/regions in this study only covers the 20 years from 
1996 to 2015. Imputation of missing data is discussed in Annexe I, and a detailed statistical 
summary appears in Annexe III. 
 
6.1.4 Interaction between political cohesion and economic accessibility 
According to the regression results above, the degree of political cohesion and the degree of 
economic accessibility are both positively correlated with economic growth, so it becomes a 
natural step to investigate the interaction between these two variables. Figure 6.1 shows a 
scatter plot for the Cohesion and the Accessibility Indices, with a linear regression fitted line.  
 
Figure 6.1 The cohesion index and the accessibility index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors' own 
 
For an in-depth investigation of the potential causality between economic accessibility and 
political cohesion, we make use of the difference-in-difference (DID) approach. By setting 
observations with a cohesion index lower than the average of the variable as a control group, 
and setting those with a higher-than-average cohesion index as a treatment group, we find 
that higher political cohesion tends to boost higher accessibility. As Table 6.2 reports, this 
effect is statistically significant. Taking the same strategy, we also examine the potential 
causal effect of accessibility on political cohesion, but the Difference-in-Difference (DID) test, 
as reported in Table 6.3, does not support this direction of causality. 
 
Furthermore, we also explore the causality between accessibility and political cohesion by 
controlling the development stage, as reported in Table 6.4. Notably, there is no significant 
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causality between the two indices when the GDP per capita falls below USD 4000 or rises 
above USD 12,000, but the causality becomes significant when the GDP per capita falls 
within [4000, 12,000]. In particular, both directions of causality are extremely significant when 
the GDP per capita falls within [8000, 12,000]. 
 
Table 6.2 DID test for causal effect of political cohesion on economic accessibility 
Outcome var.     Accessibility S. Err.         t  P>t 
Baseline         
Control        -35.052 
   
Treated        -33.658 
   
Diff (T-C)     1.394 9.538 0.15 0.884 
Follow-up         
Control      -35.033 
   
Treated        -33.640 
   
Diff (T-C)     1.393 9.533 0.15   0.884 
Diff-in-Diff      -0.000 0.005  -0.10   0.921 
R-square 0.06    
Note: (1) *** p<0.01; **p<0.05; * p<0.1 
     (2) Means and Standard Errors are estimated by linear regression 
Source: Authors' own 
 
Table 6.3 DID test for causal effect of economic accessibility on political cohesion 
Outcome var.     Cohesion S. Err.        t  P>t 
Baseline         
Control        -4.498 
   
Treated        8.241 
   
Diff (T-C)     12.739 7.736 1.65 0.100* 
Follow-up         
Control      -4.494 
   
Treated        -29.956 
   
Diff (T-C)     8.239 7.732 1.65  0.100* 
Diff-in-Diff      12.733 0.004  -1.61   0.107 
R-square 0.06    
Note: (1) *** p<0.01; **p<0.05; * p<0.1 
     (2) Means and Standard Errors are estimated by linear regression 
Source: Authors' own 
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Table 6.4 Test for causality direction between economic accessibility and political 
cohesion 
Development Stage Accessibility as the Cause Cohesion as the Cause 
(GDP per capita)         
0-4000 0.131 0.779 
4000-8000 0.018** 0.1* 
8000-12,000 0.007*** 0.008*** 
12,000-16,000 0.438 0.821 
Note: (1) *** p<0.01; **p<0.05; * p<0.1 
     (2) Means and Standard Errors are estimated by linear regression 
Source: Authors' own 
 
6.2 Specification of the econometric model 
Given the data structure discussed above, a dynamic panel model could be specified as 
follows:  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
 
where, for country 𝑖 in year 𝑡: 
 
• 𝑦𝑖𝑡 denotes the growth rate of GDP per capita (constant price, local currency); 
• 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of explanatory variables, (𝑥1𝑖𝑡 , 𝑥2𝑖𝑡 , 𝑥3𝑖𝑡 , 𝑥4𝑖𝑡), with 
o 𝑥1𝑖𝑡 denoting the accessibility index,  
o 𝑥2𝑖𝑡 denoting the cohesion index,  
o 𝑥3𝑖𝑡 denoting the peak index, and  
o 𝑥4𝑖𝑡 denoting the development stage
28; 
• 𝑍𝑖𝑡 denotes a set of control variables, including lagged terms of 𝑦𝑖𝑡, population, area, 
etc.  
• As usual, 𝛽 denotes a vector of coefficients（𝛽1，𝛽2，𝛽3，𝛽4）before 𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝛾 denotes 
a vector of coefficients before 𝑍𝑖𝑡, and 𝑢𝑖𝑡  is the error term of the model.  
 
If the conjectures proposed in Section 3.3 hold, both 𝛽1and 𝛽2 are expected to be positive 
while 𝛽3 is expected to be not significantly different from 0. Moreover, in line with the 
literature about economic development, we anticipate 𝛽4 to be negative; that is, the 
economic growth rate is lower for economies at higher development stages. 
 
6.3 Estimation results 
6.3.1 Pooled OLS estimation 
We first run an OLS regression and estimate a benchmark model without controlling any 
other variables, with results reported in column (1) in Table 6.5. Since our data have been 
                                               
28  The development stage of country 𝑖 in year 𝑡 is defined based on the GDP per capita of the country in that year. If the 
GDP per capita falls within [0, 4000] (US$), then the development stage receives a value of 1; if the GDP per capita falls 
within [4000, 8000], a value of 2; within [8000, 12,000], then 3; within [12,000, 16,000], then 4; above US$16,000, then 5. 
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standardised, the value of the coefficients estimated does not tell much about the relative 
importance of the explanatory variables, and we care more about the signs (positive or 
negative) of these coefficients. As expected above, the coefficients before the accessibility 
and cohesion indices are both positive, which seems to support Conjecture 1 and Conjecture 
2; meanwhile, the insignificance of the coefficient before the peak index suggests that we 
cannot reject Conjecture 3.  
 
However, the low R2 value in Table 6.5 column (1) indicates that these four variables are very 
insufficient to fully explain economic growth. Taking this point into consideration, we 
introduce the lagged terms of 𝑦𝑖𝑡 into the model as control variables, with estimation results 
reported in columns (2) - (4) of Table 6.5. One may note here that the overall fitness of the 
model has improved significantly with the lagged terms controlled, according to the higher R2 
values. More importantly, although the values of the relevant coefficients have changed, their 
signs have not. This offers continued support for Conjecture 1 and Conjecture 2 while still not 
allowing us to reject Conjecture 3. 
 
Table 6.5 Pool OLS estimation results for the benchmark model 
Dependent 
Variables 
Growth Rate of GDP per Capita (𝒚𝒊𝒕) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Accessibility Index 0.509 0.331 0.291 0.302 
 
(5.01)*** (3.44)*** (2.96)*** (3.02)*** 
Cohesion Index 0.392 0.229 0.237 0.28 
 
(4.06)*** (2.51)** (2.53)** (2.95)*** 
Peak Index -0.016 0.011 0.005 0.011 
 
(0.30) (0.23) (0.10) (0.21) 
Development Stage -0.518 -0.342 -0.339 -0.346 
 
(9.32)*** (6.47)*** (6.25)*** (6.26)*** 
𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 
 
0.394 0.358 0.348 
 
 
(26.41)*** (21.57)*** (20.54)*** 
𝑦𝑖𝑡−2 
  
0.083 0.056 
 
  
(5.12)*** (3.16)*** 
𝑦𝑖𝑡−3 
   
0.088 
 
   
(5.35)*** 
Constant 1.326 0.738 0.696 0.436 
 
(3.53)*** (2.07)** (1.91)* (1.17) 
Observations 3899 3695 3491 3287 
R-squared 0.02 0.18 0.19 0.2 
Note: (1) Standard errors in parentheses; (2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. 
Source: Authors' own  
6.3.2 Estimation results based on panel analysis 
Given the balanced panel structure of our data, we respectively estimate both a random-
effect and a fixed-effect model with different lagged terms of 𝑦𝑖𝑡; the estimation results 
appear in Table 6.6. Here we can see that the three columns of results for the random-effect 
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model are exactly the same as the pooled OLS estimation results29 – as before, supporting 
Conjecture 1 and Conjecture 2 without permitting rejection of Conjecture 3. In the fixed-effect 
model, while the coefficient before the cohesion index is not always significant, we still have 
a positive sign across all of the three columns.  
 
Table 6.6 Estimation results for the random effect model and the fixed effect model 
Dependent 
Variables 
Growth Rate of GDP per Capita (𝒚𝒊𝒕) 
RE (1) RE (2) RE (3) FE (1) FE (2) FE (3) 
Accessibility Index 0.331 0.291 0.302 0.811 0.724 0.654 
 
(3.44)*** (2.96)*** (3.02)*** (3.43)*** (2.99)*** (2.61)*** 
Cohesion Index 0.229 0.237 0.28 0.441 0.393 0.338 
 
(2.51)** (2.53)** (2.95)*** (2.12)** (1.83)* (1.54) 
Peak Index 0.011 0.005 0.011 -0.017 -0.024 0.006 
 
(0.23) (0.10) (0.21) (0.19) (0.25) (0.06) 
Development Stage -0.342 -0.339 -0.346 -0.846 -0.804 -0.912 
 
(6.47)*** (6.25)*** (6.26)*** (3.98)*** (3.55)*** (3.85)*** 
𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 0.394 0.358 0.348 0.251 0.249 0.243 
 
(26.41)*** (21.57)*** (20.54)*** (15.42)*** (14.48)*** (13.82)*** 
𝑦𝑖𝑡−2 
 
0.083 0.056 
 
-0.019 -0.013 
 
 
(5.12)*** (3.16)*** 
 
(1.11) (0.74) 
𝑦𝑖𝑡−3 
  
0.088   -0.004 
 
  
(5.35)***   (0.25) 
Constant 0.738 0.696 0.436 0.623 0.927 1.44 
 (2.07)** (1.91)* (1.17) (0.65) (0.93) (1.39) 
Observations 3695 3491 3287 3695 3491 3287 
Number of ID 204 204 204 204 204 204 
R-squared    0.07 0.07 0.07 
Note: (1) Standard errors in parentheses; 
     (2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
     (3) RE refers to ‘Random Effect’, and FE refers to ‘Fixed Effect’. 
Source: Authors' own 
 
In addition – and consistent with the pooled OLS estimation results – the coefficient before 
the development stage is robustly negative, meaning that an economy at a higher 
development stage tends to grow at a lower rate. At the same time, the coefficient before the 
first-order lagged term of 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is robustly positive, indicating a significant autoregressive 
property in the economic growth rate.  
 
Furthermore, conducting the Hausman test on the columns RE(1) and FE(1) suggests a 
systematic difference between their coefficients. But, as mentioned earlier in this section, our 
                                               
29  In general, estimation results of the random-effect model are not the same as the pooled OLS estimation. However, 
when there is a lagged term of the dependent variable on the right-hand side of the random-effect model, there will not 
be any difference in the estimation results between it and the pooled OLS. Theoretical support for this result appears in 
Badi H. Baltagi (2001). Given this property, we will not report pooled OLS estimation results, but only the random-effect 
estimation results as long as the model retains the lagged term as noted on the right-hand side. 
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data has been standardised, and we care more about the signs of these coefficients than 
about their value. In this sense, the econometric support for the three major conjectures, at 
least based on the benchmark analysis, remains solid. 
 
6.4 Robustness checks and discussion 
In this section, we conduct a series of checks to test the robustness of the results obtained 
based on the benchmark model. First, we add more control variables; second, we examine 
the interaction between key variables and economic development level; third, we replace the 
key index variables with the sub-indices to expand the details investigated. A short summary 
concludes this section.  
 
6.4.1 Robustness with more control variables 
Based on the model with the first-order lagged term of the dependent variable, we now add 
the following control variables: the area of the country/region, which could approximately 
represent its natural resources; its population, considered another kind of fundamental 
resource; and GDP per capita. The estimation results appear in Table 6.7 and are 
comparable to the results in column RE(1) and FE(1) in Table 6.6. We see that there is no 
significant change in the results, especially no change in the signs of the most relevant 
coefficients. Furthermore, when we also replace the area and the population by the area per 
head, no significant change is found.  
 
Again, as mentioned earlier in this section, the consistent coefficient signs across different 
model specifications are sufficient to support the conjectures, although the coefficient values 
differ. Up to this point, we can say that our econometric results are robust. 
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Table 6.7 Robustness with more control variables 
Dependent Variables 
Growth Rate of GDP per Capita (𝒚𝒊𝒕) 
RE (1) RE (2) RE (3) FE (1) FE (2) FE (3) 
Accessibility Index 0.303 0.295 0.333 0.816 0.766 0.774 
 
(3.11)*** (3.03)*** (3.28)*** (3.45)*** (3.21)*** (3.22)*** 
Cohesion Index 0.231 0.25 0.274 0.438 0.446 0.456 
 
(2.53)** (2.74)*** (2.97)*** (2.10)** (2.14)** (2.18)** 
Peak Index 0.012 0.016 0.027 -0.017 -0.012 -0.01 
 
(0.23) (0.32) (0.55) (0.19) (0.13) (0.11) 
Development Stage -0.335 -0.321 -0.264 -0.845 -0.858 -0.753 
 
(6.32)*** (6.05)*** (3.49)*** (3.97)*** (4.03)*** (3.37)*** 
𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 0.393 0.387 0.387 0.25 0.25 0.251 
 (26.33)*** (25.91)*** (25.58)*** (15.41)*** (15.37)*** (15.26)*** 
Area 0 0 0 0.013 0.016 0.014 
 (1.68)* (0.23) (0.22) (0.76) (0.92) (0.84) 
Population  0.002 0.002  0.011 0.012 
  (3.75)*** (3.75)***  (1.52) (1.56) 
GDP per Head   -0.009   -0.037 
   
(1.46)   (1.55) 
Constant 0.746 0.649 0.415 -7.702 -9.804 -9.073 
 (2.10)** (1.82)* (1.09) (0.70) (0.88) (0.80) 
Observations 3695 3695 3615 3695 3695 3615 
Number of ID 204 204 196 204 204 196 
R-squared    0.07 0.07 0.08 
Note: (1) Standard errors in parentheses; 
     (2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
     (3) RE refers to ‘Random Effect’, and FE refers to ‘Fixed Effect’; 
     (4) The unit of Area is 1000 squared km; 
     (5) The unit of Population is 1 million; 
     (6) The unit of GDP per Head is 1000 USD (2010 Price). 
Source: Authors' own 
6.4.2 Interaction between key variables and economic development 
Next, we choose to introduce the product terms of the three key variables along with the 
variable of development stage, to investigate potential interaction between economic 
development and accessibility, political cohesion, and political power concentration. For 
instance, we can look at whether the effect of accessibility on growth would be greater or 
smaller at different development stages. For brevity, we report only estimation results for the 
fixed-effect model in Table 6.8 below, along with the benchmark result (column FE(1) in 
Table 6.6) for the sake of comparison. 
 
First, we find that the partial effect of accessibility on growth has a significant negative 
correlation with the development level. For instance, as columns FE(2) and FE(5) in Table 6.8 
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suggest, when an economy is at development stage 1 (see note 8 and Annexe I), the partial 
effect is 1.19, but when the development stage is at 3, the partial effect is expected drop to 
0.51.30 In other words, accessibility is generally more important to economies at lower 
development levels. In addition, the inclusion of the interaction term of accessibility and 
development does not change the coefficients of other variables, which we can verify by 
comparing columns FE(1) and FE(2).  
 
In contrast, it seems that political cohesion plays an increasingly more important role as the 
economy’s development level rises. For instance, the partial effect of political cohesion on 
growth is not significantly different from 0.25 at development stage 1, but for a country at 
stage 3, the partial effect is expected to be roughly 0.54. We have almost the same finding in 
column FE(5). From another perspective, we find that at higher levels of political cohesion, 
countries/regions will tend to see a slow drop in growth rate. Again, comparison of columns 
FE(1) and FE(3) indicates that the inclusion of the political cohesion/development stage 
interaction term does not change the coefficients of other variables such as the accessibility 
or the peak indices and 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1. 
 
However, no significant interaction appears between the peak index and the development 
level; the neutrality of growth vis-à-vis political power concentration seems to hold for 
countries/regions across all development levels. This finding is robust to different 
specifications, as shown in columns FE(1), FE(4) and FE(5) in Table 6.8. 
  
                                               
30  As mentioned earlier, since all key explanatory variables have been standardised, it makes little sense to compare the 
values of coefficients across variables; however, the partial effect of the same variable remains comparable with an 
interaction term in the model.   
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Table 6.8 Interaction between key variables and economic development 
Dependent Variables 
 Growth Rate of GDP per Capita (𝒚𝒊𝒕) 
FE (1) FE (2) FE (3) FE (4) FE (5) 
Accessibility Index 0.811 1.529 0.823 0.809 1.543 
 
(3.43)*** (4.15)*** (3.48)*** (3.42)*** (4.19)*** 
Cohesion Index 0.441 0.441 0.103 0.446 0.129 
 
(2.12)** (2.12)** (0.30) (2.14)** (0.37) 
Peak Index -0.017 -0.024 -0.016 0.037 0.035 
 
(0.19) (0.26) (0.17) (0.25) (0.23) 
Development Stage -0.846 0.153 -1.265 -0.723 -0.104 
 
(3.98)*** (0.34) (3.12)*** (2.12)** (0.16) 
𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 0.251 0.248 0.25 0.25 0.248 
 
(15.42)*** (15.28)*** (15.37)*** (15.41)*** (15.21)*** 
Accessibility * Development  -0.34   -0.342 
  (2.54)**   (2.55)** 
Cohesion * Development   0.147  0.138 
   (1.21)  (1.13) 
Peak * Development    -0.033 -0.034 
    (0.46) (0.48) 
Constant 0.623 -1.153 1.505 0.422 -0.546 
 
(0.65) (0.97) (1.25) (0.40) (0.36) 
Observations 3695 3695 3695 3695 3695 
Number of ID 204 204 204 204 204 
R-squared 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08 
Note: (1) Standard errors in parentheses; 
     (2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
     (3) FE refers to ‘Fixed Effect’. 
Source: Authors' own 
 
6.4.3 Robustness tests with China dropped from the data 
Since China has grown very fast over the observation period, one might wonder how well the 
model performs with China dropped from the data. This subsection test the robustness of the 
econometric results above in both section 6.4.1 and section 6.4.2, through dropping China’s 
data. For brevity, we only report estimation results for the fixed-effect model in Table 5.9 
below, with columns FE(1)-(3) corresponding to FE(1)-(3) in Table 6.7 and columns FE(4)-(7) 
corresponding to FE(2)-(5) in  can find, there is little change in the estimation results. 
 
  
68 
 
Table 6.9 Robustness tests with China dropped from the data 
Dependent Variables 
Growth Rate of GDP per Capita (𝒚𝒊𝒕) 
FE (1) FE (2) FE (3) FE (4) FE (5) FE (6) FE (7) 
Accessibility Index 0.814 0.764 0.772 1.525 0.822 0.808 1.54 
 
(3.44)*** (3.19)*** (3.20)*** (4.13)*** (3.47)*** (3.41)*** (4.17)*** 
Cohesion Index 0.427 0.437 0.447 0.431 0.082 0.435 0.109 
 
(2.04)** (2.08)** (2.13)** (2.06)** -0.23 (2.07)** -0.31 
Peak Index -0.017 -0.012 -0.01 -0.024 -0.016 0.04 0.037 
 
-0.19 -0.13 -0.11 -0.26 -0.18 -0.27 -0.25 
Development Stage -0.838 -0.84 -0.734 0.157 -1.269 -0.707 -0.104 
 
(3.90)*** (3.91)*** (3.26)*** -0.35 (3.12)*** (2.04)** -0.16 
𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 0.25 0.249 0.25 0.248 0.249 0.25 0.247 
 (15.34)*** (15.30)*** (15.19)*** (15.22)*** (15.30)*** (15.34)*** (15.14)*** 
Area 0.013 0.016 0.015     
 -0.76 -0.93 -0.86     
Population  0.012 0.013     
  -1.53 -1.56     
GDP per Head   -0.037     
 
  -1.55     
Accessibility * Development    -0.339   -0.341 
    (2.52)**   (2.54)** 
Cohesion * Development     0.151  0.142 
     -1.25  -1.16 
Peak * Development      -0.035 -0.036 
      -0.48 -0.5 
Constant -7.143 -9.244 -8.553 -1.145 1.532 0.408 -0.528 
 -0.69 -0.89 -0.81 -0.96 -1.27 -0.39 -0.35 
Observations 3676 3676 3596 3676 3676 3676 3676 
Number of ID 203 203 195 203 203 203 203 
R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08 
Note: (1) Standard errors in parentheses; 
     (2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
     (3) FE refers to ‘Fixed Effect’; 
     (4) The unit of Area is 1000 squared km; 
     (5) The unit of Population is 1 million; 
     (6) The unit of GDP per Head is 1000 USD (2010 Price). 
Source: Authors' own 
 
6.4.4 Analysis with the sub-indices 
Given the limits on key variable construction above, in this subsection we would like to 
replace them with the sub-indices to elicit further details, as shown in Table 6.10 below.  
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First, we replace the accessibility index with the internal and external accessibility indices, 
with all other variables fixed (including the first-order lagged term of 𝑦𝑖𝑡); the random-effect 
estimation result appears in column (1). As we find, both internal and external accessibility 
are important to a country/region’s growth, but external accessibility appears to have a 
relatively higher impact. Furthermore, when we replace both sub-indices by their sub-sub-
indices, as reported in column (3), we find that the business start-up index (measuring 
internal accessibility of the capital market) and the FDI-based external accessibility index 
(which provides a measure of external accessibility) outperform other indices in explaining 
the contribution of accessibility to growth.  
 
Second, we replace the cohesion index with its three sub-indices, again with all other 
variables fixed (including the first-order lagged term of 𝑦𝑖𝑡) and the random-effect estimation 
result appearing in column (2). We find that both government effectiveness and policy 
accountability share a significant positive correlation with a country/region’s economic 
growth, while the share of taxes in total GDP does not have a significant non-zero 
explanatory power. 
 
Lastly, when we replace both the accessibility and the cohesion indices with their sub-
indices, with estimation results reported in column (4), the following variables still have 
significant non-zero partial effects: the indices for business start-ups, FDI-based external 
accessibility, government effectiveness, and policy accountability. Additionally, coefficients 
before other variables, including the peak index development stage, and lagged growth rate 
of GDP per capita, remain quite robust.  
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Table 6.10 Pool OLS estimation results for the sub-index model 
Dependent Variables 
Growth Rate of GDP per Capita (𝒚𝒊𝒕) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Accessibility Index 
 
0.284 
  
  
(2.89)*** 
  
Internal Accessibility Index 0.152 
   
 
(1.79)* 
   
Logistics Index 
  
-0.044 -0.089 
   
(0.81) (1.50) 
Wage Index 
  
0.084 0.083 
   
(1.20) (1.19) 
Business Start-up Index 
  
0.218 0.233 
   
(3.38)*** (3.42)*** 
External Accessibility Index 0.237 
   
 
(2.98)*** 
   
FDI Based External Accessibility 
  
0.586 0.58 
   
(7.09)*** (7.01)*** 
Trade Based External Accessibility 
  
-0.121 -0.104 
   
(1.79)* (1.53) 
Structure Based External Accessibility   0.037 0.003 
   (0.82) (0.06) 
Cohesion Index 0.235  0.149  
 (2.57)**  (1.61)  
Government Effectiveness Index  0.385  0.263 
  (2.94)***  (1.75)* 
Accountability Index  0.23  0.257 
  (2.55)**  (2.67)*** 
Share of Tax out of GDP  0.053  0.006 
  (0.78)  (0.08) 
Peak Index 0.018 0.031 0.004 0.056 
 (0.35) (0.55) (0.07) (0.97) 
Development Stage -0.333 -0.388 -0.344 -0.344 
 (6.10)*** (5.76)*** (6.10)*** (5.04)*** 
𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 0.393 0.392 0.372 0.369 
 (26.38)*** (26.23)*** (24.65)*** (24.40)*** 
Constant 0.541 -0.123 -0.437 -1.394 
 (1.42) (0.21) (1.05) (2.22)** 
Observations 3695 3695 3695 3695 
R-squared 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.19 
Note: (1) Standard errors in parentheses; 
     (2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Authors' own 
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7 Concluding remarks 
This paper proposes a new institutional analytic framework for explaining a country’s path 
from poverty to wealth. We first build a political economic model under our analytic 
framework; we prove that, faced with the emergence of a potential competing group, a 
patient interest group or party seeking long-term governance will optimally choose an 
unbiased approach under single-peaked political governance, while compromise, consensus, 
and common actions provide the optimal choice under multi-peaked governance. Moreover, 
we introduce this political model into a three-sector overlapping-generation (OLG) model, 
and show that continuous economic growth relies on the combination of an access-opening 
regime and political cohesion; either unbiased single-peaked political governance or 
compromise-oriented multi-peaked governance may support this scenario.  
 
Following the theoretical model, we propose three conjectures and test them based on a 
panel dataset of 209 economies from 1996 to 2015. To recap: we have specified and 
estimated a benchmark econometric model, based on both the pooled OLS and panel 
analysis approaches. Overall, the coefficient before the accessibility index is significantly 
positive, supporting Conjecture 1 - an economy’s accessibility can facilitate its economic 
growth; we also have a significantly positive coefficient for the cohesion index, supporting 
Conjecture 2 – a society’s cohesion can strengthen its economic growth. However, the 
coefficient before the peak index does not differ significantly from zero, which suggests that 
Conjecture 3 cannot be rejected - the presence of single- vs. multi-peaked political 
governance is a neutral variable in the country’s economic growth. The model also adds 
evidence to the literature about the relationship between growth and development level; that 
is, the economic growth rate is lower for economies at higher development stages. 
 
We tested for robustness by introducing additional control variables, examining interactions 
between key variables and development level and between political cohesion and 
accessibility, and adduced further details by replacing variables with their sub-indices.  
While the estimated coefficient values for major variables may vary, their signs remain robust 
across specifications – giving statistically sufficient support for our theoretical results. 
 
As it happens, this study has strong implications for China. If it seeks to become a modern, 
high-income country, it should maintain unbiased political governance and take further 
actions to increase the economy’s accessibility. In particular, the country needs more efforts 
to avoid the degeneration of unbiased single-peaked governance. Beyond this, the 
econometric work of this study suggests the feasibility and value of generalising its proposed 
framework on an international scale, by conducting case studies for a set of representative 
countries, including the U.S., Japan, India, Russia, Argentina, British, Germany and even the 
whole of Europe, as well as Africa. Such a panel of studies could supply additional evidence 
for the model’s robustness across a range of governance arrangements and development 
levels, eliciting additional data of immense value. 
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Annexes 
Annexe I Definition and construction of variables/indices 
In this annexe, we give a detailed introduction to our means of constructing the key 
variables/indices in this study.  
 
A 1.1 Variables about economic performance 
In this study, we collected the following variables about economic performance from the 
World Bank Databank: 
 
• GDP per capita (2010 Constant Price, USD) 
• GDP per capita (2011 PPP, International Dollar) 
• GDP per capita (Current Price, Local Currency) 
• Growth Rate of GDP per capita (Constant Price, Local Currency) 
 
With several exceptions, we have complete data for these variables for 209 countries/regions 
during the period from 1996 to 2015. Based on the GDP per capita (2010 Constant Price, 
USD), the development stage of country 𝑖 in year 𝑡 is defined as follows: if the GDP per 
capita falls within [0, 4000] (USD), it receives a stage 1 designation; within [4000, 8000], 
stage 2; within [8000, 12000], stage 3; within [12000, 16000], stage 4; for GDP per capita 
above USD 16000, stage 5. 
 
Moreover, close examination of the data on GDP per capita growth indicates substantial 
volatility across countries, with the range falling between -100 per cent and 134 per cent, – 
the volatility being especially marked in small economies with high vulnerability to shocks. 
For this reason, we take a data-smoothing strategy to reduce the effects of outliers. Firstly, 
we set 20 per cent as a threshold for the data imputation, i.e., if the GDP per capita growth of 
an economy in a given year is higher than +20 per cent or lower than -20 per cent, we 
consider it an outlier. Secondly, if the observations before and after an outlier appear regular, 
we replace the outlier with their average; if one outlier is followed by another, or even by a 
series of outliers, we assume that the GDP per capita growth changes at a smoothing rate 
over the period, and that we might obtain the change rate from the two closest regular 
observations and the number of successive outliers, and replace them accordingly; if an 
outlier falls in the year of 1996 or 2015, we simply replace it with the closest regular 
observation. In addition, we take the same strategy to impute the series with missing data. 
 
A 1.2 Construction of variables about economic accessibility 
Accessibility has great importance during the development of an economy. Internally, 
accessibility means that production factors, including labour and capital, have sufficient 
opportunities to participate in production activities, and that products can also move freely on 
the market at low costs, with little discrimination and few barriers to mobility. Externally, 
accessibility means the integration of the domestic market into the global one and its 
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openness to foreign economic participants. Hence, we construct two sub-indices – internal 
and external – to capture the economy’s accessibility. 
 
As noted above, we construct the internal accessibility index from three sub-indices 
corresponding to accessibility of capital, labour, and goods markets.  
 
Capital market accessibility: measured via the cost of business start-ups, say the ratio of 
the cost of business start-ups over GNI per capita. The ratio is standardised as follows: first, 
the top 2.5 per cent observations are assigned a value of 5 and the bottom 2.5 per cent 
observations a value of 0; for other observations, the rule is  
𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑑 =
𝑅𝑎𝑤 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛−2.5% 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑙𝑝𝑒
2.5% 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒  𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑙𝑝𝑒−2.5% 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑙𝑝𝑒
∗ 5.  
Next, considering that a higher value (higher cost) means lower capital market accessibility, 
we subtract the assigned value from 5 and finish the standardisation of the variable. Missing 
values are imputed using the same approach as for the GDP per capita growth rate. 
 
Labour market accessibility: measured by the number of passengers carried by each 
kilometre of railway in a year, and the percentage of regularly salaried workers out of the 
total employed population. For the passenger-rail calculation, we first impute the missing 
data for each country using the same approach as the GDP per capita growth rate; second, 
we take the base 10 logarithm of the imputed series. Third, we follow a standardisation 
procedure similar to that for the capital market index and arrive accordingly at the 
standardised index: we first assign a value of 5 the top 2.5 per cent observations and 0 to the 
bottom 2.5 per cent observations, and for other observations, we assign values as 
follows:𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑑 =
𝑅𝑎𝑤 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛−2.5% 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑙𝑝𝑒
2.5% 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒  𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑙𝑝𝑒−2.5% 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑙𝑝𝑒
∗ 5.  
As for the percentage of regularly salaried workers out of total employed population, we also 
first impute the missing data, but follow a slightly different standardisation procedure  – not 
cutting the top or the bottom 2.5 per cent observations, but simply following the rule 
𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑑 =
𝑅𝑎𝑤 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛−𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑙𝑝𝑒
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒  𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑙𝑝𝑒− 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑙𝑝𝑒
∗ 5 to obtain the 
standardised index. 
 
Goods market accessibility: measured by the logistics performance index, also scaled 
from 0 to 5. The imputation procedure is the same as for all variables above, and the 
standardisation procedure is also similar to the capital market index: we assign the 5 and 0 
values to the 2.5 per cent top/bottom observations as before; for other observations, we 
assign values as per the rule:  
𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑑 =
𝑅𝑎𝑤 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛−2.5% 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑙𝑝𝑒
2.5% 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒  𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑙𝑝𝑒−2.5% 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑙𝑝𝑒
∗ 5.  
In total, we have four standardised indices. The average of the four gives us the internal 
accessibility index, standardised in turn following the same procedure. 
 
74 
 
We construct the external accessibility index from sub-indices about the scale of 
international trade and FDI, and export varieties. First, we use the average of two ratios 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑛 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦  𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦⁄
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑⁄
 and 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑛 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦  𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦⁄
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑⁄
 to 
measure the relative scale of the external market for domestic goods. Second, we use the 
average of the following two ratios to measure the openness of the domestic and the 
accessibility of the international capital markets: 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐹𝐷𝐼 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦⁄
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐹𝐷𝐼 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑⁄
and
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑂𝐷𝐼 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦⁄
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐹𝐷𝐼 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑⁄
; Third, 
considering that an economy’s openness is not only reflected in the scale of the international 
market, but also by its diversity and structure, we construct another index based on the 
variety of exports to capture this point.  
 
Trade-based external accessibility: as discussed above, this index is constructed based 
on the average of the two ratios 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑛 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦  𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦⁄
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑⁄
 and 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑛 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦  𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦⁄
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑⁄
. For each ratio, missing values are imputed in the 
same way as for dealing with outliers above, and the cubic root of the ratio is taken for each 
observation. We then standardise the cubit roots by assigning the top/bottom 2.5 per cent the 
values of 5 and 0 as before, and assign values for other observations following the rule: 
𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑑 =
𝑅𝑎𝑤 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛−2.5% 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑙𝑝𝑒
2.5% 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒  𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑙𝑝𝑒−2.5% 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑙𝑝𝑒
∗ 5.  
 
FDI-based external accessibility: measured by the average of the following two ratios: 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐹𝐷𝐼 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦⁄
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐹𝐷𝐼 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝐺𝐷𝑃 ⁄
and 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑂𝐷𝐼 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦⁄
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐹𝐷𝐼 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝐺𝐷𝑃⁄
. The imputation and 
standardisation procedure is exactly the same as for the trade-based external accessibility 
index. For each ratio, missing values are imputed in the same way as for dealing with the 
outliers above, again taking the cubic root of the ratio for each observation. We standardise 
the cubic roots according to the same top/bottom + 5-and-0 method as before, assigning 
values to other observations as follows  
𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑑 =
𝑅𝑎𝑤 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛−2.5% 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑙𝑝𝑒
2.5% 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒  𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑙𝑝𝑒−2.5% 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑙𝑝𝑒
∗ 5. 
 
Structure-based external accessibility: measured by varieties of exported goods. We first 
sum up the shares of agricultural goods, minerals, and fuels in an economy’s total exports. 
After imputing the data, we impose a standardisation procedure on the series, similar to that 
for the capital market accessibility index – according to the usual 2.5 per cent top/bottom 
5 and 0 values, and the following rule for other observations: 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑑 =
𝑅𝑎𝑤 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛−2.5% 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑙𝑝𝑒
2.5% 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒  𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑙𝑝𝑒−2.5% 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑙𝑝𝑒
∗ 5. Considering that a higher value 
means that an economy relies more heavily on primary goods exports, we subtract the 
assigned value from 5 and finish the standardisation of the variable. 
75 
 
In total, we have three standardised indices. Taking the average of the four gives us the 
external accessibility index, which we then standardise again following the same 
procedure. Given the internal and external accessibility indices, we take the average of the 
two and obtain the overall accessibility index for each country and each year.   
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Annexe II The accessibility index of top 50 countries/regions in 2015 
 
Table A.1 The accessibility index of top 50 countries/regions in 2015 
Rank Country/Region Accessibility Index Rank Country/Region Accessibility Index 
1 Hong Kong 4.761 26 France 3.665 
2 Singapore 4.731 27 Saudi Arabia 3.570 
3 Qatar 4.662 28 Slovak Republic 3.556 
4 Netherlands 4.630 29 Czech Republic 3.546 
5 Kuwait 4.526 30 Malaysia 3.511 
6 Switzerland 4.316 31 Slovenia 3.510 
7 Iceland 4.186 32 South Africa 3.489 
8 UAE 4.070 33 Cyprus 3.485 
9 Norway 4.067 34 Spain 3.469 
10 Germany 4.064 35 Malta 3.467 
11 Ireland 4.010 36 Lithuania 3.463 
12 Darussalam 3.999 37 Finland 3.454 
13 Luxembourg 3.980 38 Bahamas, The 3.436 
14 Sweden 3.961 39 United Kingdom 3.374 
15 Bahrain 3.940 40 Korea, Rep. 3.358 
16 Angola 3.929 41 United States 3.336 
17 Kazakhstan 3.865 42 China 3.308 
18 Canada 3.849 43 Latvia 3.300 
19 Russian 3.822 44 Belgium 3.299 
20 Denmark 3.795 45 Belarus 3.228 
21 Australia 3.794 46 Bulgaria 3.219 
22 Austria 3.765 47 Japan 3.210 
23 Trinidad 3.744 48 Israel 3.171 
24 Oman 3.712 49 Mongolia 3.163 
25 Chile 3.689 50 Italy 3.161 
Source: Authors' own 
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Annexe III Statistical summary 
Table A.2 Original growth rate of GDP per capita (constant local currency) 
 Percentiles Smallest   
1% 257.114 122.486 
  
5% 417.22 186.919 
  
10% 547.291 190.957 Obs 3,827 
25% 1283.39 194.169 Sum of Wgt. 3,827 
50% 4272.48 
 
Mean 12539.9 
75% 14480.4 108182 Std. Dev. 18266.16 
90% 40429.6 111069 Variance 3.34*108 
95% 49366.6 140103 Skewness 2.281435 
99% 85321.2 145221 Kurtosis 8.962301 
Source: Authors' own 
 
Table A.3 Adjusted growth rate of GDP per capita (constant local currency) 
 Percentiles Smallest   
1% -9.598471 -18.87481 
  
5% -4.428827 -17.80674 
  
10% -2.272727 -17.53277 Obs 3,899 
25% 0.1243468 -16.55811 Sum of Wgt. 3,899 
50% 2.325342 
 
Mean 2.379248 
75% 4.545455 18.00259 Std. Dev. 4.161236 
90% 7.366479 18.48745 Variance 17.31589 
95% 9.090909 18.50895 Skewness -.1946895 
99% 13.6366 18.98937 Kurtosis 5.171056 
Source: Authors' own 
 
Table A.4 Distribution of total population 
 Percentiles Smallest   
1% 20118 9264 
  
5% 66143 9298 
  
10% 109049 9334 Obs 4,011 
25% 1261319 9374 Sum of Wgt. 4,011 
50% 6114534 
 
Mean 3.26*108 
75% 2.14*107 1.35*109 Std. Dev. 1.27*108 
90% 6.13*107 1.36*109 Variance 1.60*1016 
95% 1.20*108 1.36*109 Skewness 8.657534 
99% 3.21*108 1.37*109 Kurtosis 82.8496 
Source: Authors' own 
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Table A.5 Distribution of total area (square km) 
 Percentiles Smallest   
1% 29.9 2 
  
5% 320 2 
  
10% 610 2 Obs 4,011 
25% 18270 2 Sum of Wgt. 4,011 
50% 106440 
 
Mean 640138.6 
75% 469930 1.60*107 Std. Dev. 1796019 
90% 1300000 1.60*107 Variance 3.23*1012 
95% 2400000 1.60*107 Skewness 5.484667 
99% 9200000 1.60*107 Kurtosis 37.48108 
Source: Authors' own 
 
Table A.6 Distribution of economic accessibility index 
 Percentiles Smallest   
1% 0.5689773 0.0001555 
  
5% 1.067816 0.0224922 
  
10% 1.41832 0.0378827 Obs 4,011 
25% 1.919779 0.0726487 Sum of Wgt. 4,011 
50% 2.46387 
 
Mean 2.508516 
75% 3.07239 4.939485 Std. Dev. 0.8937671 
90% 3.795123 4.947343 Variance 0.7988196 
95% 4.075285 4.954062 Skewness 0.2173619 
99% 4.658958 4.999506 Kurtosis 2.876116 
Source: Authors' own 
 
Table A.7 Distribution of cohesion index 
 Percentiles Smallest   
1% 0.5681818 0.0126263 
  
5% 1.622314 0.0252525 
  
10% 1.969603 0.0315657 Obs 4,011 
25% 2.45012 0.0441919 Sum of Wgt. 4,011 
50% 2.853374 
 
Mean 2.812628 
75% 3.257232 4.603872 Std. Dev. 0.7075269 
90% 3.697931 4.715909 Variance 0.5005943 
95% 3.871294 4.722222 Skewness -.7466589 
99% 4.146333 5.012626 Kurtosis 4.430902 
Source: Authors' own 
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Table A.8 Distribution of governance peak index 
 Percentiles Smallest   
1% 0 0 
  
5% 0.0007477 0 
  
10% 0.5201714 0 Obs 4,011 
25% 2.337371 0 Sum of Wgt. 4,011 
50% 2.640255 
 
Mean 2.681837 
75% 3.502648 5 Std. Dev. 1.25166 
90% 4.529181 5 Variance 1.566653 
95% 4.778799 5 Skewness -.1823232 
99% 5 5 Kurtosis 2.861105 
Source: Authors' own 
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